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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2144

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25 May 1983

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ALBANIA

HOXHA CONGRATULATES MACEDONIAN-LANGUAGE TRANSLATOR

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 27 Mar 83 p 1

[Telegram from Enver Hoxha to Comrade Nikolla Berovski]

[Text] Dear Nikolla,

I received the translation of the book "Rreziku anglo-amerikan per Shqiperine" (The Anglo-American Threat to Albania) which you have translated into the Macedonian language. I am very happy that you, an Albanian citizen of Macedonian nationality, have done this work. I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart and, at the same time, I express my conviction that, in the future, you will be translating other political and literary works for brothers and sisters who speak the same language.

The Macedonians who live with the Albanians in their common socialist fatherland have always been and still are close to each other. Our party, implementing Marxism-Leninism with determination, has never considered them to be foreigners and objects of contempt. It has considered them to be brothers of the Albanians with fully equal rights. Therefore, among the Albanians and the Macedonians today, in the age of the party, there are such close ties that no enemy can break.

With the care of the party and with the support of all the Albanian people, the Macedonian villages, once backward and desolate, have prospered. Life in them has been radically changed. With their work and sweat, the peasants have built new houses while the state has built schools, health centers and cultural centers, a broad trade network, etc. Many Macedonian sons and daughters are in the leadership of the party and government organs and many others, side by side with the Albanians, are giving their assistance in the four corners of the fatherland; they are progressing and they will progress on the shining road to socialism, to the advancement and prosperity of the entire fatherland and the personal well-being of each person.

In conclusion, dear Nikolla, I wish you health, joys and happiness in family life and success in work.

Yours truly,

ENVER HOXHA

CSO: 2100/47

FRENCH JOURNALIST REPORTS ON TRIP TO NATION

Paris ESPRIT in French Mar 83 pp 135-145

[Article by Andre Dali]

[Text] In Europe, less than 1,500 kilometers from us, lies a small country which is almost never talked about but which certainly deserves more attention. Albania--as big as Belgium but with a population of just under 3 million--is one of the world's most impenetrable countries. One of the last countries still to take Stalinism as its model, Albania has successively allied itself with and then fallen out with Belgrade, Moscow, and Peking. Today it stands alone. The foreigner who goes to Albania always visits the same enterprises, always sees the same people, and generally does not even realize that fact, being protected by his blissful ignorance of the language, which is so different from all others, and by the invisible wall erected by the authorities between him and the population. Most travelers wind up confirming the image of the country as presented by official propaganda--an image also relayed by the friendship associations to which certain academics lend the support of their names and their pens.

I am aware of the disjointed nature of these notes, which considerations of space force me to abridge. It was also impossible for me to gain an overall view of the country. What I saw was due solely to my relative familiarity with the language and with the realities of East Europe. By slipping away from my group early in the morning or during the siestas, I was able to see a little more than official Albania. It is a country suffering from the isolation and economic difficulties into which the despotism of its leaders has plunged it, but it is also a country of people who cannot speak to us but who certainly deserve more than the indifference we show toward them.

Rinas Airport

My first impression in Albania was extraordinarily negative. The Hungarian plane landed at the small Rinas Airport--the country's only civilian airport.

The passengers traveling in groups (individual travel is permitted only for a few very carefully chosen unconditional supporters) grew suddenly quiet as the plane came to a stop. The door opened, and I felt the warm air from outside. The engine in the small van bringing up the stairway also became quiet. Looking out the porthole, I saw small blockhouses lining the runway. Their cyclopean eyes watched me distrustfully, and the silence reinforced that impression. The passengers followed each other off the airplane in silence. When my turn came, I noticed that we were surrounded by armed soldiers with bayonets on their guns. The customs check was not strict. In front of the airport, near an armed soldier and next to a number of official cars with dozing drivers, a bus from ALBTOURIST, the government tourist agency that determined every detail of our trip, was waiting for us. One wing of the airport terminal had been converted into an exhibit of propaganda pictures: surrounding a big picture of Enver Hoxha were pictures of combine harvesters and new buildings. The loudspeakers were pouring out martial music reminding one of an army marching into battle.

First Contact

The bus took us to the hotel for foreigners near Durres. Albania seemed very poor. Peasants were working in the big collective fields, and it could be seen that most of the work was done by hand. From time to time, a hiccuping old Chinese tractor could be seen pulling a trailer, but usually horses were being used to pull them, and everywhere, the harvest was being loaded by hand.

Along the road there were slogans--more than in any other East European country. They followed me everywhere during my stay--on the fronts of houses, in the hotels, factories, and public buildings and parks, in schools and kindergartens, and even on the mountainsides, where hundreds of big rocks had been collected, usually to spell out the name of Enver Hoxha (pronounced Hoja). In the cities, there were even small slogan factories with surprising productivity. There were many slogans announcing the eighth party congress, which was to be held within a few months. There was not much traffic--a few old Chinese trucks, a few motorcycles (especially Czechoslovak Jawas from the late 1950's), and an occasional automobile, usually a Polish Fiat of recent vintage. The buildings on the collective farms were in poor condition, and many farm implements were covered with rust. Those seen working in the fields were mostly women in patched clothing, and some of them were even barefoot. The road was bordered by small blockhouses, and groups of soldiers could frequently be seen. For a few fractions of a second, I glimpsed an antiaircraft battery hidden from the road by an embankment.

Foreigners in Albania

The hotel complex for foreigners is near the beach and 4 kilometers south of Albania's second-largest city, the port of Durres (90,000 inhabitants). The groups of tourists all stay in those hotels, as do a few Albanians from Kosovo. In those gray and sinister buildings, where visitors from every Western country rub shoulders, the night is spent fighting off mosquitoes while being lulled to sleep by the monotonous low lament of socialist plumbing, whose running toilets can be heard as the hours pass. Albania is curiously absent from those buildings,

where it is represented only by the hotel personnel, the party's specialized lecturers, and the polyglot guides from ALBTOURIST. Very fortunately, we were permitted to stroll in the hotel's vicinity (but preferably in a group, because "the visa is collective"), but for "security reasons," we were not allowed to go into the town. Most of our nights were spent in that hotel, even after we had spent the day in another town, and this meant that the group's spare time was taken up with official visits and interminable bus rides.

The guides accompanied us throughout our trip. They were replaced frequently without advance warning, and always in groups of two--you figure it out. Naturally, their real employer is the party and not ALBTOURIST, and that is why their career depends on how well they can defend the official viewpoint. I therefore refrained from asking any embarrassing questions. Some of them were real fanatics whom it was best to avoid discreetly. Others expressed a few reservations--at least with certain tourists--concerning the official viewpoints. The rules struck me as very strict. With no witnesses around, one of them complained to me about the low Albanian wages. One day I saw him staring at my cigarette lighter, and I offered to give it to him. "Not here," he told me, so I slipped it into his pocket while we were walking down the poorly lighted corridor leading to our hotel rooms. Another guide once whispered a complaint in my ear concerning the stupidity of Albanian regulations when his colleague was confiscating film from a traveler who had had the misfortune to photograph the center of a town where, of course, there were a few military--who are omnipresent in the country.

To keep foreigners from taking walks near the hotel, they offered us a whole series of activities: free movies, excellent raki (unobtainable, by the way, in ordinary stores), and a good orchestra playing Western music on the hotel terrace every evening--interspersed, of course, with Enver Hoxha's song. A nightclub for foreigners was open until 1 o'clock in the morning. I don't know what kind of strange prejudice kept the authorities from adding a ring of call girls to round out the splendid isolation in which foreigners, often without realizing it, were kept.

Shops

While the tourists were digesting the raki they had drunk in the nightclub, I rose early to take a solitary stroll in the vicinity of the hotel.

There were a few very modest shops near the hotel (I realized later that they were quite luxurious by Albanian standards). There was a butcher shop that was almost always closed, two fruit and vegetable stands, a few small stores where one could buy beach articles, shirts, and yardage, a barber shop (beards, a symbol of the abominable feudal past, are banned, but just recently, officials have stopped forcing bearded tourists to go to the airport barber shop). The average hourly wage is 3 leks, according to official information, which struck me, incidentally, as rather optimistic. Here are the prices of a few items: 2 leks for a kilogram of bread, 4 leks for a stick of butter weighing about 150 grams, 2.50 leks for a kilogram of apples or pears, from 45 to 60 leks for a rather crudely made shirt, and from 250 to 350 leks for a pullover sweater. There was a bookstore that also sold newspapers. Half of the books (and I

discovered later that this was true of all bookstores) were political works. Works by comrade Enver Hoxha occupied 40 percent of the shelf space, followed by selected works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Most of the other books were novels of socialist realism by Albanian authors. A dozen or so titles had no direct connection with politics, and they, of course, were the classics: a few translations of Victor Hugo or Balzac and a few detective novels. I rarely saw any Albanians reading during my stay. When I did, they were always reading the translation of a foreign author.

I also noticed that the hours posted at the stores did not correspond to reality. The fruit and vegetable shops were almost always closed, and when they were open, customers crowded around the counter.

It was 7 o'clock in the morning. In front of the closed butcher shop, about 20 men, squatting in the Oriental fashion, were already waiting. Today there was to be meat. The loudspeakers in the street were broadcasting the morning's news: the Red Star cooperative near Korce had exceeded its plan by 30 percent; in Italy, thousands of workers were on strike; in Poland, there was no meat in the stores; the Party Steel industrial complex was now producing steel of even better quality; and there had been a wave of arrests in Kosovo. In Northern Ireland, there were new battles between patriots and British soldiers. And a new school had just been inaugurated in Shkoder. The voice fell silent and was replaced by martial music. It was 8:15. The line in front of the butcher shop had grown to twice its original size. A van arrived and unloaded two cases containing the same kind of meat, full of bone and tendons, in plastic sacks. The counter opened, passers-by joined the line, and the clerk got busy. Sitting on a tree stump, I watched the street. A policeman blew his whistle, and the traffic (one cart, an old truck, and a few bicycles) came to a halt. A big Mercedes swept by like a whirlwind with no one in it except the driver to be seen: small curtains concealed the passengers. It was followed by an army jeep. A second later, traffic was back to normal. The Mercedes and its high-ranking passengers had disappeared.

The butcher shop closed its window. The last customers came out with empty sacks. It was 8:30.

Durres

Although Durres was only a quarter of an hour away from our hotel by bus, we were not able to visit the downtown area before we had passed through it several times. Our bus had barreled through the center of town twice to stop in front of the archeological museum and the cemetery where partisans were buried. After those visits, we returned to the hotel to listen to interminable political talks. All I remember from those trips through town was the sight of two very long lines in front of stores, but I did not have time to see what the stores were selling.

The third trip to Durres was luckier. After visiting the ancient theater, we were able to walk around--in groups, of course, but it was easy to get away from them for half an hour on the downtown shopping street. The standard of living is indisputably the highest in the country after that in Tirana, and the

stores were better supplied than those I was to see in other towns. The downtown area is of recent construction. The new buildings, all built on the same plan, were not aging gracefully--after just a few years, the fronts had turned gray and were peeling. There were many television antennas on the roofs. There was little traffic on the streets, but it was much more dense than in the other provincial towns. Occasionally one saw a poor wretch in rags, but most of the people were modestly but decently dressed.

The most expensive goods did not carry price stickers, and I took advantage of my familiarity with the language to ask the price of people passing by. They answered me quickly and disappeared with a smile as though to excuse themselves. Here are a few prices: the average monthly net wage is 600 leks for a 48-hour workweek, to which is added a 2-week paid vacation every year. A wall clock costs 400 leks, and a radio costs 900 leks (probably a tube model--of the three models shown in the shop window, this one, the most modest, was the only one with a price sticker). In a liquor store, there was no raki. The shelves were filled with only four kinds of liquor in half-liter bottles. There was ouzo at 10 leks a bottle, Albanian cognac (of not very good quality) at 12 leks, Albanian vodka at 10 leks, and some rough and fearsome gin at 10 leks. The latter was almost undrinkable. The tobacco shop sold only four kinds of cigarettes, costing from 1.5 to 4 leks, depending on quality. In many tobacco shops, there was only one brand at 3 leks. The men smoke a great deal, that pastime being relatively free of ideology. Old women smoke, too, but I did not see any young women smoking. It seems that the party has conducted a very vigorous campaign on that subject.

In the food stores, there was generally nothing more than fruit and vegetables: apples, pears, onions, eggplant, fat watermelons, and grapes. The bakeries sell only one kind of bread, and it is gray and coarse. There were still four kinds of jam (200 grams for 4.50 leks) and two kinds of cheese. While I saw rice, I saw no potatoes anywhere during this season except in the hotels for foreigners. The Albanians warm themselves with small cookstoves that also serve, naturally, for cooking and for heating water, since apartments do not have hot water. A cookstove costs 3,500 leks. Stalin has his statue on the main street (as he does in every town in Albania). I passed a small auto electrical shop. The workers offered me some grapes and immediately returned to their work. They were rewinding generator rotors and starters by hand.

Visits to Factories

The organized visits to factories naturally give a very inaccurate idea of industry, since the factories visited by foreigners are (who could doubt it?) the most modern in the country. To realize that, all one has to do is pay close attention to the industrial zones through which one passes. Some of them are of interest to tourists: a rug factory or a wireworks. In Tirana, I visited the Enver Hoxha tractor factory, which officially (and many Western journalists have repeated the statement) now produces complete tractors after starting out by producing spare parts for Chinese tractors. Actually, production from that factory, with its recent Chinese equipment, is limited to spare parts for tractors, since the only Albanian tractors are a few specimens that the press is allowed to photograph to its heart's content. One of them is in a museum in

Tirana. Our visit to the Plastika factory in Durres sums up all the others quite well. It is one of the most modern factories in the country. Of all those I saw, it was far and away the most recent and the one where working conditions seemed the best. The lobby was covered with slogans to which no one seemed to pay any attention. Graphs showing percentages (it has been a long time since Albania has published anything except percentages) show tremendous growth in industrial production. But my visits to a number of factories gave me the impression that those data are exaggerated. What is more, I could not escape the certainty that Albanian industry has been experiencing a serious crisis since the break with China.

Although visitors are taken through the workshops at a trot, it is still possible to see that Albania's modest industry is the product of foreign aid--first Yugoslav, then Soviet, and finally Chinese, which stopped a few years ago. Most of the machinery is Chinese, but there is also some that was bought from other countries. Out of 20 machines, 2 came from the FRG and 1 was from France. Of the 20 machines on the second floor, 1 was from the FRG and another was from Austria. Those machines produce flasks, sandals, and toys. The Chinese machines, technologically much simpler, produce only flat-surfaced objects. The date of their construction can be read: 1975. Three have already stopped functioning, and one can see that some of the parts are broken and probably have been for a long time, since they are covered by quite a thick layer of dust. Officially, every factory has its own shop for turning out the missing parts. It is also said that Albania produces 95 percent of the spare parts it needs, but a simple look around leads one to think that there is no truth to that statement. We were also told that the average wage here was 650 leks per month. I could not verify that, but in other factories, away from inquisitive ears, I asked workers what they really earned, and their wages were always 20 percent less than the official figure.

Tirana

Downtown Tirana--the capital, with 230,000 inhabitants--is certainly a showcase and richer than the suburbs we had passed through. The big main square is called Skanderbeg after the legendary hero of the resistance against the Turks. Everything around that square is new--the giant palace of culture, the museum of history (in the process of completion), the Albanian state bank, and the fine Tirana Hotel, where we stayed. Many people were out for a stroll. The number of strollers in Albanian cities is surprising. One would think that no one works. In the evenings, the strollers take the boulevards by storm, and Tirana then resembles a giant fair for an hour.

The Tirana Hotel is the most modern in the country: fine double rooms with pleasant furniture and bathrooms where the plumbing does not leak. There is a good Italian elevator and a restaurant where we ate an excellent meal that contrasted with the mediocre cooking in the hotel in Durres. Tips are forbidden in Albania, but here the waitresses discreetly accepted mine without concealing their joy. In front of the hotel, a gang of gypsy children in rags was begging from the tourists. They seemed to be afraid of the police, however, because when I tried to take their picture, they ran away.

In front of the hotel is the great Stalin Boulevard with its enormous statues of Lenin and Stalin and its numerous government buildings, which carried no external indication of what they were and which were guarded at night by armed sentinels. Also there are the luxurious Italian-built Dajti Hotel, the museum of modern art, and the headquarters of the party Central Committee. The surrounding streets are closed to traffic and guarded by armed sentinels and members of Sigurimi (political police), who are so obtrusive that they are easily spotted. Strollers always use the other side of the street. The boulevard ends 200 meters away at a building that is part of the technical university. Turn left 100 meters past the Central Committee building, and you enter a neighborhood of fine private homes surrounded by large shady parks and guarded by soldiers who, when they spotted me, signaled to plainclothesmen who were certainly Sigurimi agents. It was easy to guess that members of the political elite lived there.

Downtown Neighborhoods

It is difficult to know the names of the main streets, since only the side streets carry street signs. I was unable to find a city map anywhere in the country--all I could find was a rather vague map of the entire country. Neither did I see any telephone directories either at the hotel or in the post offices. In the stores, it is impossible to find record players, records, or cameras, except occasionally in Tirana, where, incidentally, I was unable to find film for my camera. But members of the party elite own good Praktica cameras, Samsonite attache cases, Ray-Ban eyeglass frames, and many other products that are unobtainable in the country. It seems obvious to me that they have at their disposal a network of stores inaccessible to the ordinary mortal--a system that is almost general in the communist world--but it would be impossible for me to confirm that suspicion.

In the evenings, I strolled through the old neighborhoods in the center of town, and I got the impression that life before the revolution was not as grim as it is now depicted. Almost everywhere, there were small whitewashed houses, and almost all of them had yards surrounded by low walls, with a few trees. In the summer, it is pleasant to chat protected from the heat. In a dark and deserted dead-end street, an Albanian woman spoke to me and told me she had studied in Budapest, then disappeared just as suddenly as she had appeared, with a smile as though to excuse herself.

Political Talk

At 6 o'clock in the evening, we went into the small lounge at the hotel, where a lecturer from the party worked his way painfully through a memorized text. I was very amused to see that for a few moments, the woman interpreter, tired by our long trip, was translating the second part of the talk while the lecturer was still reciting the first part. Sometimes the guides would prompt the lecturer (in Albanian, naturally--the language in which, incidentally, without making any gestures that might give them away, they would order poorly dressed children or stray ragamuffins to leave the stores where we went to make our group purchases). For hours it seemed that the flood of eloquence would never end. "The cult of personality does not exist in our country.... Comrade Enver

Hoxha is our collective brain. If someone does not toe the line, we cut off his finger; if that is not enough, we cut off his hand; and if that is not enough, we cut off his head." (I must say that such a brutally frank admission left me flabbergasted.) Finally, there was silence--our meal was delayed by a good hour. I looked at my fingers--they were yellow with nicotine. And then I understood why the men smoked so much in this country.

Countryside

Two-thirds of the country's inhabitants live in the countryside. Officially, Albania's agriculture is developed, but the rural areas left me with an impression of infinite poverty and dreariness. The bus never stopped in a village or at a farm, and only twice were we taken to a cooperative--that is, to a field where, in the shade of a tree, a lecturer spoke to us about agriculture, after which we left without seeing a single stable or chickenhouse. Once we even visited a village which struck me as quite prosperous. The bus stopped in front of the school (which was deserted at that hour), where the party secretary was waiting for us, and we were taken into the school with the promise that we would be given a tour of the village later (later, naturally, it was pitch black and the streets were not lighted, so we left town no wiser than when we had arrived). The peasants who came to see us and surrounded the bus in increasingly large numbers were ordered by the guides to go away, but of course, none of the tourists realized it. The only information I remembered from that talk was that wages varied between 14 and 21 leks per day, a statement that contradicted to some extent the official claim that the minimum wage was 2 leks per hour.

Tampering With History

During our stay in Korce, a major historical center in the eastern part of the country (60,000 inhabitants), we visited the office of the local committee of the Union of Women. As in all public buildings, the lobby had its little display of propaganda. A bust of the great comrade stood surrounded by collections of his sayings against a red background. We were allowed to visit an exhibit on the role of women in the partisan fighting, but I avoided it since I knew in advance what it would be like. I visited the neighboring library instead. A new edition of the beloved leader's works was enthroned in the place of honor. A thick layer of dust covered the top of the books, indicating that no one reads them. In one of the photographs at the exhibit, a black spot seemed to be hiding something. I was looking at a book of photographs of the "new" Albania. It had been published in 1969--that is, before the split with Peking and the latest series of bloody purges. Eight of its 200 pages had been removed. Another curious feature was that in a photograph showing members of the Politburo, two faces were covered with a cross in black ink so that they could not be recognized: the victims of the purges.

Religion

On the side of the mountain in Berat, the Orthodox church seemed to have been converted into a warehouse. And the number of mosques is extremely limited. I saw only one in Tirana and one in Korce, and I can guarantee that there are

many more in Yugoslavia or in other countries that were once occupied by the Turks. I suppose that several have been destroyed. Religion is banned by the constitution, and the churches have been closed since 1967 (no doubt following the example of China's Cultural Revolution). Religion can survive only on the modest and concealed scale of the family unit. In 1973 three priests, including the Catholic priest Shtjefen Kurti, were executed--Kurti simply because he had baptized a child. And that is only the tip of the iceberg (those executions were announced on Tirana Radio). In Saranda, I saw an Orthodox church that had been converted into a parking area for bicycles in the back yard of a new building. In general, a small notice is erected--"Cultural Monument Protected by the State"--and with the exception of sites visited by tourists, the buildings of worship are then left in a state of neglect. The Great Mosque in Korce is in ruins. Located in an old neighborhood where tourists are not taken, it is inhabited by the homeless, who fled at my approach. Along the main road, the bus passed a few cemeteries where I could see tombs in the traditional Moslem and Christian styles. Some even had a cross or a crescent, and their stone was still white, leading one to think that they were recent and that people still believe despite the ban. That was all I could see of religion in Albania.

Ballsh

The bus was crossing the oilfields in Ballsh (pronounced as spelled). The refinery, rather modest by Western standards, was built by the Chinese, but they had not completed it when the rupture occurred. We were told that they had tried to sabotage it, but that struck me as rather farfetched. In any case, only a part of the facility is operating today. The river that runs through Ballsh is black with refinery waste. The regime prides itself on having a pollution-free country and on having given priority to the protection of nature. Those stories have been repeated in France by Rene Dumont. It is true that there is little pollution--wherever there is no industry. But where industry exists, nature is generally much more polluted than in our country, even though the factories are few and small. The derricks and pumps were in very poor condition. Even from the bus, we could see that the pipes were leaking: the ground was black with crude oil. One pump out of 10 was no longer working. Are the machines too old? Is the deposit becoming exhausted? Throughout the country, gas stations are covered with slogans urging people to conserve fuel.

War and Isolation

In the provinces, the road offers a constantly changing spectacle. Few tractors and combine harvesters were to be seen in the fields. Old men and children were tending skinny cattle. Only the framework remained on the greenhouses, many of which were in very poor condition. Civilian and military donkeys were pulling their ramshackle carts. Many peasants were walking along the road. Sometimes, especially in the south, we saw wooden plows pulled by oxen. The small wooden stands selling fruit and vegetables were almost always closed. The farther south we went from the Durres plain, the lower the standard of living seemed to be. In front of one farm building, I glimpsed an interesting scene for a few seconds: peasants in ragged clothing, and many of them barefoot (between 10 and 20 percent of the peasants work in bare feet), were sitting on the ground in

front of a desk, and from behind it, a cadre dressed in a suit was haranguing them. Naturally, it was impossible to ask the bus driver to stop--we would have been told that we did not have time or perhaps that we would be taken to visit another farm, or perhaps we would not have been answered at all. And the blockhouses were always everywhere, although it is true that they were less numerous here than in the Durres region: they were on the mountains, in the fields, in the towns and villages, in the hotel courtyard, and in the schoolyards. Paradoxically, there were very few of them in the Korce region, which is near the Yugoslav frontier. Maybe the authorities fear an invasion by the Italian Navy. Once we even passed an entire company of soldiers returning from exercises: their weapons looked Chinese and were quite ancient, while the submachineguns were copies of the famous Soviet Kalashnikov. The guides avoided answering the questions asked by some of the travelers.

The entire country lives in a carefully maintained obsession with war. Women in uniform are often seen in the cities. Thousands of slogans are concerned with blockades and bourgeois-revisionist encirclement, while others call for vigilance. In Berat I even read this: "Let us beware of foreign perversions." Military service lasts for 2 or 3 years (probably depending on the branch of service), after which there is a compulsory 2-week training period every year. Military instruction and training are compulsory in the schools, even for girls. In the factories as everywhere else, there are military exercises and paramilitary groups, and there are signal lights to warn of nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological attack. Big signs at the factory entrances explain how to protect oneself from a chemical, nuclear, or bacteriological attack. One may smile at the sight of a gas mask improvised with the help of a handkerchief, but that is not its purpose. It is simply a matter of channeling the discontent that might be caused by privations toward an imaginary enemy. In the cities we passed through, we saw mounds whose entrance was a small iron door. It took me a long time to realize that they were nuclear bomb shelters.

Final Impressions

I was back at the Rinas Airport, surrounded by armed soldiers just as I had been when I arrived. There were the same propaganda photographs, with the beloved leader giving me a strange look. There was the same martial music and the same symbolic customs check. "They are more liberal than we are," murmured an African who had never left the guides once during the entire visit. In front of the stairs leading up to the airplane, a policeman was carefully checking each traveler's visa and the photograph on his passport. Near him was an armed soldier. That way, no one would be able to run to the plane at the last minute to leave the country. With the exception of two or three cadres on business trips or diplomats, the passengers were tourists. Albanians never leave the country. The plane took off, and at the other end of the runway, we could see an antiaircraft battery and three military MiG's hidden by some branches. The buildings grew smaller, and I noticed that only the main road was tarred--the others were simply dirt roads. The mountains grew more distant. I had seen everything that a foreigner can see of Albania, and that was very little. The plane headed for the sea, thus lengthening its route--it does not have permission to fly over the country.

September-October 1981-April 1982

CHANGE IN DECREE ON HIGHER-TYPE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Tirana GAZETA ZYRTARE in Albanian No 2, Mar 83 p 39

[Decree on a modification of Decree No 4864 of 15 July 1971 "On the Creation of Higher-Type Agricultural Cooperatives"]

[Text] On the basis of Article 78 of the Constitution;

Upon recommendation of the Council of Ministers;

The Presidium of the Peoples Assembly of the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania resolves:

Article 1

A new paragraph with the following content is added after Article 3 of the decree:

"Insofar as the effect of the share of state investments is concerned, the agricultural cooperatives in the zone of the priority intensification of agricultural and livestock production are equivalent to higher-type agricultural cooperatives."

Article 2

This decree goes into effect immediately.

Tirana, 26 February 1983

Decree No 6734

For the Presidium of the Peoples Assembly of the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania

Secretary

SIHAT TOZAJ

Chairman

RAMIZ ALIA

FOREIGNERS GIVEN ASYLUM ENTITLED TO PENSIONS

Tirana GAZETA ZYRTARE in Albanian No 2, Mar 83 p 37

[Decree Supplementing Decree No 6346 of 29 June 1981 "On the Treatment of Foreigners Given Asylum in the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania"]

[Text] On the basis of Article 78 of the Constitution;

Upon recommendation of the Council of Ministers;

The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania resolves:

Article 1

A paragraph with the following content is added to article 3: "Foreigners given asylum have the right to receive old-age pensions or to receive permanent monthly assistance when they reach the age of 55 for men, and 50 for women."

Article 2

This decree goes into effect immediately.

Tirana, 26 February 1983

Decree No 6732

For the Presidium of the Peoples Assembly of the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania

Secretary

SIHAT TOZAJ

Chairman

RAMIZ ALIA

CSO: 2100/47

ALBANIA

COMPENSATION FOR CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE WORKERS

Tirana GAZETA ZYRTARE in Albanian No 2, Mar 83 p 38

[Decree on Granting Compensation to a Member of an Agricultural Cooperative Who Is Deprived of Work Without Justification]

[Text] On the basis of Article 78 of the Constitution;

Upon recommendation of the Council of Ministers;

The Presidium of the Peoples Assembly of the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania resolves:

Article 1

A member of an agricultural cooperative, who is deprived of work because he is charged with a penal offense and the charge is withdrawn or who is found not guilty, receives from the agricultural cooperative the average monthly compensation for the previous year for the entire period that he has been without work.

Article 2

This decree goes into effect 15 days after its publication in GAZETA ZYRTARE.

Tirana, 26 February 1983

Decree No 6733

For the Presidium of the Peoples Assembly of the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania

Secretary

SIHAT TOZAJ

Chairman

RAMIZ ALIA

CSO: 2100/47

ALBANIA

LENIN PARTY SCHOOL DIRECTOR NAMED

[Editorial Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 11 March 1983 page 1 identifies Prof Jorgji Sota as director of the "V.I. Lenin" Party School, a post formerly held by Fiqrete Shehu, wife of the late chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu.

CSO: 2100/47

CIVIL DEFENSE IN TURKEY EXAMINED--PART II

Sofia GRAZHDANSKA OTBRANA in Bulgarian No 2, 1983 pp 32, 33

[Article by Tsvyatko Genov: "II. Civil Defense in Turkey"; for part I see JPRS 83209, 16 April 1983, No 2126 of this series, pp 14-16]

[Text] Proceeding from the fact that in a future war of nuclear and missile weapons there will be an increased use of aircraft, missiles, high-explosive and incendiary bombs and nuclear weapons, the governmental leaders of Turkey hold to the conception that not only troops and military installations, but also the civilian population in the country, industry, transportation and communications will come under the pressure of enemy attack. Therefore the specialists believe that any future war will be a life-and-death struggle not only between armed forces, but also between countries and peoples and that success in war can be achieved only through well-organized civil defense.

Civil defense, according to this conception, can be implemented through the performance of organizational and defense measures not only on the part of the government, but also on the part of the population itself. The concern of the government in this regard takes the form of measures to reduce the number of places vulnerable to enemy attack in cities and to evacuate and disperse the entire population or part of it. Civil defense sets up local services trained and equipped already in peacetime.

These services attend to correcting small infractions, rescuing people, rendering first aid to casualties and sick people, providing for people left shelterless, preventing panic and confusion, extinguishing fires and controlling damage.

To organize and help the public under difficult conditions, civil defense wardens are appointed in every district. It is believed that rescue teams (formations) will not have a chance to render necessary aid. Other measures are provided for this purpose. Every family must create its own defense organization, stocking materials as well to preserve their lives and property. Members must know the procedure in the event of attack, for rescuing buried people, for rendering first aid in the event of injuries, for extinguishing fires etc.

Boulevard and street wardens are selected for this purpose. A warden and deputy are selected for every street which it is assumed will come under possible attack.

Boulevard and street wardens in peacetime have the obligation to help the civil defense wardens in the district and explain defense questions to the public. They see to the selection of suitable people in the building defense groups and to their training. In wartime the civil defense wardens provide necessary assistance to building defense groups in extinguishing fires, rescuing personnel and rendering first aid. So as to be recognized by the citizens, the boulevard and street wardens will wear an identification tag and carry their individual military kit.

Building defense groups are formed from the residents of a given building. The personnel of these groups have specific obligations: to extinguish fires, undertake first rescue measures and render first aid, to provide necessary materials.

A building defense group consists of a chief and--depending on the number of residents--a fireman and a rescue worker and, in buildings in which there is a shelter, a shelter warden. Their makeup can be enlarged, depending on the number of residents. Groups are manned by males from 16 to 65 years of age, who have no other national-defense obligations. If the number of males does not suffice, females are assigned. Only the group chief is selected, and he for his part names the rest. The group chief familiarizes the group with the measures that must be taken to protect the buildings and their inhabitants. He keeps track of whether people living in the building comply with the warning to take shelter. In a crisis he organizes the group to carry on rescue operations. Whenever it is necessary, building-defense group chiefs join with street wardens to render assistance.

Turkey's civil defense regulations stipulate the materials which are prescribed for protection of the city-dwelling population. These are fire extinguishers, packaging for the protection of products and liquids, materials needed for rendering first aid and for repairs, and products which must be on hand in a shelter. The type and kind of all these materials are indicated.

Special attention is given to the question of rendering mutual assistance. Proceeding from the fact that however well organized civil defense may be, it cannot cope with thousands of casualties--buried and wounded--and with the many fires breaking out. Therefore it is recommended that the citizens render mutual assistance themselves. After an attack those remaining in a sound condition are obliged to render first aid to relations who are wounded and sick, and then to neighbors.

They must know methods of stopping a hemorrhage, protecting wounds against infection etc. It is indicated that in the absence of dressings, materials at hand can be used for this purpose. The civil defense regulations give the ways of rendering aid for burns, fractures, suffocation, frostbite etc. The types and quantities of medical supplies and the methods of storing them are also listed.

Various kinds of shelters are designated for the protection of the population and construction of these is anticipated in large cities, small towns and the larger residential buildings. In districts where it is assumed that there will

be no direct attack, so-called "radioactive-dust-proof shelters" are being built. Depending on their purpose, shelters are special or general. Special shelters are intended for the families of residents in given buildings. They are constructed by the owners of the buildings. General shelters are built wherever there are enough people (marketplaces, garages, ports, railroad stations) and wherever traffic is very busy. They are under construction by the government jointly with municipal and private enterprises and institutions. In addition, the construction of light family radioactive-dust-proof shelters is envisaged. They are simply and cheaply built. Basement and ground-floor windows are banked with sandbags and bags of earth. A zigzag entrance in front of doors is made out of sandbags or concrete blocks. If only part of the basement is under ground, the walls of the remaining part are strengthened with sandbags or with bricks.

According to the concepts of the Turkish leaders, it may be imperative to stay in the shelter for 1 or 2 weeks. Therefore all needs that will arise during the stay must be thought out beforehand and the necessary measures taken.

For the defense of the population in Turkey, evacuation of certain threatened regions is envisaged. To be evacuated first and foremost are children, mothers, elderly and sick persons. Officials in the economy, industry and public services are to remain in their places and continue their activity in the event of a dispersal. In the event of a state of emergency the time at which the evacuation will begin will be announced by the appropriate authorities on the radio or through other means of public address. Persons who are to be evacuated but are not willing to go voluntarily will be expelled by the police.

The Turkish civil defense leaders assign an important place to the question of providing food stores to feed the population in the event of a nuclear conflict. According to the specialists, all foodstuffs must be protected against contamination by radioactive dust, chemical warfare agents and bacteriological materials. As a result, it is required that these products be housed in closed containers and in places where radioactive dust, toxic substances and bacteria cannot penetrate. For this purpose the following measures are provided: reserves of grain, beans and other important foods and feeds are to be stored in cities and towns which will not be a target of attack; in a state of emergency these foods will be protected in basements and trenches and covered with a thick layer of earth; foods and feeds in the open are to be collected in mounds and covered, where possible, with oilcloth and other covering materials and buried under earth. In order to protect edibles and potables in houses, stores and other commercial establishments, it is provided that already in peacetime they should be packed in well-sealed boxes, in tanks, cans and refrigerators. During a state of emergency meat, flour, bread, dishes and other similar products that are to be found in butcher shops, bakeries and restaurants must on no account be left in the open.

The civil defense regulations indicate that in order to protect cattle, the places where they are to be found must be mounded up and the windows and other openings closed up. To protect cattle against radioactive dust, they must be

brought under cover in suitable enclosed places and sheds. In general, it is believed that during wartime serious difficulties will arise and therefore thought must be taken now in peacetime in order to make sure of the necessary stocks of food, water and feeds.

6474
CSO: 2200/71

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRIEFS

AFGHAN STUDENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA--One of the largest groups of foreign students attending universities in the CSSR is a group of almost 180 students from Afghanistan. Another almost 30 students receive specialized secondary education in the construction and medical fields. About 30 Afghan students attend technical colleges in Prague and Brno, about 20 more study agriculture, others study at the Academy of Creative Arts and at the Academy of Music in Prague, at the faculties of law and pedagogy, faculties of journalism, physical education and sport, as well as other faculties and institutions of higher learning in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Prior to their studies, all Afghan students take language and specialized preparatory courses at one of eight centers in the CSSR, depending on their field of specialty. [Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 5 May 83 p 4]

FOREIGN BROADCAST TRANSMITTER INAUGURATED--A new Czechoslovak Broadcasting radio station specializing in broadcast to foreign countries was inaugurated in Rimavska Sobota on 11 May. Czechoslovak and Soviet experts managed to finish the project, worth more than Kcs 186 million, 2 months ahead of the schedule. [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 12 May 83 p 2]

NICARAGUAN STUDENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA--Currently, 28 students from Nicaragua study in the CSSR, mostly agriculture, medicine, economics and engineering. [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Apr 83 p 3]

CSO: 2400/263

EFFECT OF U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSESSED

Warsaw SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE in Polish No 2, Feb 83 pp 93-103

[Article by Ryszard Lawniczak: "A Turn in American Economic Policy Regarding Poland"]

[Text] The introduction of martial law in Poland in December 1981 brought about a sharp reaction from President Reagan's administration. In addition to a propaganda campaign, the reaction consisted of a package of economic sanctions against Poland that was announced on 23 December 1981. Sanctions against the Soviet Union followed.

Up to that time, Poland (in addition to Yugoslavia and Romania) enjoyed special considerations in U.S. foreign economic policy, based on taking advantage of a most favored nation [MFN] status. Thus, the sudden change in American policy may appear to be somewhat understandable to someone who is not too aware of the goals, principles and results of U.S. foreign economic policy regarding Eastern European countries, especially Poland, that were applied after World War II.

The Goals of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Regarding the Socialist Countries

A nation's foreign economic policy represents equally a part of the component whole of its economic policy and of its foreign policy. What will be implemented within its framework at a given moment, whether it is larger economic goals (such as protecting specific economic branches against competition from imported goods or supporting its own exports by means of subsidies) or the realization of political goals depends on a number of factors, for example, the economic potential of a given country, its share of the world economy, the degree to which the economy is linked with foreign countries and the like. Regarding U.S. policy, in contrast to that of Western Europe or Japan, regarding the socialist countries, political goals have been predominant during the entire postwar period, even at the cost of incurring certain economic losses.¹ Thus, economic relations with the socialist countries are considered to be a means of realizing designated political goals and not as an end unto themselves.²

In American terminology, the political goals that are desired in economic relations with the communist countries are known as "national security

concerns." Based on experiences with American policy during the whole postwar period, and interpreting the subsequent meaning of changes in economic relations with the socialist countries, these goals, dictated by national security concerns are intended, in general, to bring about a weakening of the unity of the socialist commonwealth nations and by this means limit their status in the world and their influence on the system of international relations.

The fact should be emphasized that to realize this goal, the United States has used various means during the entire postwar period. In the opinion of T. A. Wolf, the practice of "using economic strength to achieve political goals can be characterized as a carrot-and-stick policy."³ This expert also stated that "the East-West trade policy of the United States through most of the postwar period can be characterized as a policy of economic warfare in the interest of national security."⁴ In other words it is the use of the stick. Thus, President Reagan's sanctions against Poland and the USSR, implemented after 13 December 1981, merely represent a return to a policy of economic warfare that was considered during the first years of the postwar period to be a supplement to military containment."

T. A. Wolf also explains what the policy of economic warfare was and probably continues to be based on, and how very specific its goals were. They boil down to this:

"(1) To deprive the socialist world of military and strategic goods and thus to contain communist expansionism; and (2) to attempt with the aid of various resources to keep Eastern countries at an economic level as weak and susceptible as possible in the hope that it will bring about internal revolt and the independence of these countries who are considered to be satellites of the Soviet Union."⁵

When it turned out that the policy of pressure did not bring results, attempts were made in the 1970's to achieve these same goals, generally designated as national security goals, with the aid of a completely different, liberal policy that was used first in relation to Yugoslavia (since 1948) and then primarily in relation to Poland and Romania.

The more liberal policy, a complement of the "building bridges" political concept of the second half of the 1960's, was an expression of "the confidence in the indirect political benefits that could be expected in the long run as a result of intensified East-West trade....It was expected that such benefits would be achieved through an elaborate system of links brought about by expanded commercial trade, stimulated reforms in the communist economic system, the creation in the East of legally protected interest groups that would be more interested in economic prosperity than in international benefits of a political-military nature, and a basic expansion of individual freedom as well as a less hostile foreign policy."⁶

The principles of applying liberal elements in American foreign economic policy regarding the socialist countries is explained by Z. Brzezinski who wrote: "When some country increases the scope of its independence from the

Soviet Union, it should be rewarded; when some country introduces into its internal system an important change in the direction of liberalization, it also should be rewarded."⁷

The Main Stages of American Economic Policy Regarding Poland and Other Socialist Countries

Assuming as a criterion the application of restrictions for either liberal or privileged treatment, three stages can be differentiated in American foreign economic policy regarding Poland:

--the stage of maximum economic warfare, a common American policy relative to almost all the socialist countries which lasted from the beginning of 1948 to the end of the 1950's;

--the liberal policy stage affording Poland privileges compared with most other socialist countries which lasted till mid-December 1981 and thus also encompassed several months of President Reagan's administration;

--the return to economic warfare, supported by an unprecedented-in-scope propaganda campaign directed against a legal Polish Government that was inaugurated in December 1981, with the announcement of the first set of economic sanctions and supplemented by the 27 December 1982 declaration of President R. Reagan on the suspension of MFN status for Poland.

An important matter in evaluating each of these stages is the need to consider the specifics of the American process in making political decisions. It is based on the fact that two very important political centers exist that are not always in accord with one another: the President or the administration, and the Congress.

The political events in Poland after August 1980 presented President Reagan's administration as well as the Congress with the problem of possible subsequent changes in the economic policy regarding Poland. During this period there were four conflicting viewpoints in Washington.⁸

1. The United States should increase the scope of economic aid to Poland in order to avert possible intervention by the Soviet Union which would occur if anarchy increased. Such intervention would be undesirable from the American point of view. The development of the political situation in Poland in the direction of pluralism was favored in the United States and undoubtedly was a challenge to the Soviet Union. However, depriving Poland of economic aid at this time would so intensify the economic crisis and anarchy that the Soviet Union would have to intervene.

2. The United States should supply economic aid to Poland because that would put the Soviet Union and the socialist system in a bad light in world public opinion. Such aid would be the result of that system's inefficiency; the second largest socialist country will be dependent on American aid.

3. The United States should not help Poland so as to force the Soviet Union to intervene militarily. Such a step could be pointed to as an indication of Soviet imperialistic policy.

4. Finally, according to the last school of thought, the United States should not provide any help because in this way it would weaken the Soviet Union. In bearing the high costs of aid to Poland, the USSR would have to reduce significantly its outlays for military purposes.

The announcement of martial law in Poland (corresponding to the state of emergency provided for in the constitutions of other nations) in effect brought about a complete reversal in American foreign economic policy regarding Poland, and then regarding the Soviet Union. Together with the announcement by President Reagan on 23 December 1981 of the wide range of economic sanctions relative to Poland (officially, relative to WRON [Military Council for National Salvation] under the chairmanship of General Jaruzelski) and the Soviet Union, which was accused of putting pressure on Poland, there was a return to the policy of discrimination. It should be remembered that in contrast to the Cold War period and the embargo of the 1940's and 1950's, this time the sanctions were applied selectively in relation to only two countries. As can be seen, in view of the new situation in Poland, the last of the above presented schools of thought has prevailed in Washington.

Types of Sanctions and Order of Introduction

The initial economic sanctions applied by the Reagan administration against Poland are based on:

(1) the withholding of credits from the Eximbank that are guaranteed by the U.S. Government, which served above all to finance the purchase of agricultural products. Practically all food imported into Poland over the past several years has been done on the basis of credits. In 1981 credit purchases in the United States included such agricultural products as feed (including 2 million tons of corn supplying 90 percent of Poland's requirements for the production of broilers), wheat, edible oils, fats, rice and the like;

(2) the withdrawal of fishing rights for the Polish fishing fleet in American waters in the Atlantic, Pacific and along the Alaskan coast fishing zones which in the past few years have become the main fishing areas for Poland's fishing fleet and in which over 100,000 tons of fish have been harvested for Poland's domestic market and for export;

(3) the suspension of Polish flights to the United States;

(4) the encouragement of American longshoremen to refuse to load and unload Polish goods from ships.

At the same time the American administration put pressure on its NATO partners to impose similar sanctions. The reactions of America's allies varied. At the Atlantic pact's extraordinary session of 11 January 1982, the NATO members recognized the "significance of these sanctions" and committed themselves not

to undermine their effectiveness and joined in some of the restrictions applied by the United States, especially concerning the financial blockade. It was based on holding up new and blocking already allocated credits to Poland for all nonfood articles, withdrawing from the negotiations on Polish financial obligations falling due in 1982, and suspending many other forms of economic cooperation.⁹

In addition, sanctions against Poland were supported with the announcement of economic sanctions against the USSR, using the pretext of the introduction of martial law in Poland.

Additional escalation of hostile moves against Poland in the area of trade policy occurred in 1982 when on 27 November Reagan announced the suspension of MFN status for Poland. It should be remembered here that this is not the first time the U.S. Government has attempted by this means to limit Polish exports into the American market.

Poland achieved MFN status in relation to the United States on the basis of a 1931 bilateral treaty, and in the initial postwar years trade between the two countries was based on its provisions and thus on a MFN basis. The United States withdrew MFN status unilaterally in 1951 (for political reasons) by adding a new provision to the so-called Trade Agreements Extension Act. It was the Cold War period, and the denial of MFN status affected all the socialist countries except Yugoslavia.

MFN status for imports from Poland was restored in 1960. In the 1951 legislative act (on the basis of which MFN status was denied to the socialist countries), Congress gave the president the right to determine if a country is "dominated or controlled by communism." It was in 1960 that the president agreed to give Poland MFN status because "it is not under Soviet domination" according to the understanding of the 1951 legislation.

In the opinion of the cited American expert, the reasons for the above step, and more specifically, the partiality shown to Poland in this manner (later on it was only Romania) were linked with the "hope of encouraging (or a reward for) changes in the politics of a given country for our benefit....The Gomulka regime, which assumed power in 1956, was rewarded (like Yugoslavia in 1949--R.L.) by granting in 1960 MFN status to Poland. This was followed by the relaxation of some control provisions relative to the export of strategic goods. Romania was rewarded after 1964 for a foreign policy that was independent of the Soviet Union."¹⁰

Two years later the Congress in the new Trade Expansion Act (paragraph 231, article a) withdrew the mentioned right of the president to determine MFN status. The administration in striving to maintain this privilege relative to Yugoslavia and Poland induced the Congress to introduce a subsequent change in 1963 based on supplementing the mentioned paragraph 231 with article b which provided MFN status only for those two socialist countries. Thus, up to October 1982, among the socialist countries only Poland and Yugoslavia (and from 1975 also Romania) benefited from MFN trade relations with the United States.

The Effects of the Reagan Policy on Destabilizing the Polish Economy

The effectiveness of the designated set of moves in the area of economic policy should be evaluated, above all, through the prism of the goals that were sought through the implementation of such a policy. The degree to which policy goals are realized depends on a number of objective conditions that must be fulfilled to assure the understood effectiveness.

With regard to the foreign economic policy of the United States--not only with regard to Poland--at the current stage of development of international fragmentation and international exchange, the realized effectiveness of the desired political goals depends on the following factors: (1) international market conditions, especially the possibility of substituting sources of supplies and sources of credit as well as substitutes in the area of transportation services; (2) the internal economic conditions of the country imposing the sanctions that are associated mainly with the problem of whether or not a country can in the long run ignore the economic losses that are borne in realizing political goals in foreign economic policy; (3) the internal economic conditions of the countries affected by the economic sanctions, permitting a greater or lesser degree of production substitutability.

It is worthwhile mentioning here once more the political goals, dictated by national security concerns, that President Reagan's administration wishes to achieve. The concern is to destabilize the Polish economy primarily through the use of the food-credit weapon and by this means to create a successive wave of political disturbances and thus to wrest Poland away from the community of socialist nations," which in any case would lead to the economic and political weakening of Poland, the Soviet Union and the entire socialist system and to shift the global balance of power to the West.¹²

1. In analyzing the international trade situation at the start of the 1980's and the U.S. position in it, one can conclude that President Reagan did not take into consideration that the situation differs from that of the Cold War when strong restrictions were applied for the first time against the socialist countries. At that time the United States, in view of the weakened condition of Western Europe and the socialist countries, was the decisive economic power in the world. However, at the beginning of the 1970's a group of American economists opined that "the relative economic position of the United States has changed. The United States is neither the greatest entity in world trade nor the most rapidly growing economy"; for this reason "the influence of the United States either to persuade or to force others to give concessions it wanted declined."¹³

The realities of the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's confirmed the above conclusion. In addition, the causality which Marxists define as the battle for markets and sources of raw materials continues to hold with regard to the capitalist countries. Thus, the American embargo on grain deliveries to the USSR that was applied by President Carter in 1980 (in the meantime Argentina and Canada supplied the grain, and the losses were borne mainly by American farmers) and the American attempts to frustrate the transactions for supplies of Soviet gas to Western Europe ended in failure.

Regarding the attempts to cutoff Poland from the supply of a number of products, especially food, the present situation indicates that the possibility still exists for substituting supplies from other sources for American supplies, from the West as well as from the socialist countries. For example, despite pressure from the United States, both Canada and France obtained credit lines to supply Poland with 1.5 million tons of grain from each country. In addition, it should be remembered that the American administration, in simultaneously applying sanctions against the Soviet Union, vis-a-vis strategic goods, did not actually include grain in order not to lose the support of the farmers (as in the case of President Carter). Thus the socialist countries could be another source of substitute supplies.

To an increasing extent, a third source of agricultural product supplies will have to be domestic production. According to Polish estimates, as a matter of fact import restrictions affected about 3 million tons of grain and fodder, but the relatively good harvests in 1981 and 1982 (about 20 million and 22 million tons of grains) auger a good forecast even though the government has had difficulty in collecting grain from the farmers.

The possibilities of substituting new sources of supplies for imported raw materials for Polish industry are even greater. The restrictions in this area increase the significance of the share from the socialist countries and the developing countries in Polish turnovers with foreign countries.

A more difficult problem is to find substitute materials, spare parts and subassemblies for the industrial production based on Western licenses that was developed on a large scale in the 1970's. This is especially true concerning the electrical machinery industry. Some products, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry, were up to 70 percent dependent on Western imports. One solution is to find substitute domestic products (in the Ministries of Metallurgy and Machine Engineering Industry the concern is about 800 items) through the introduction of our own, original technological solutions.¹⁴

The credit restrictions, in view of Poland's enormous debt (over \$25 billion) and the burdens associated with current repayments, appear to be the most significant. Here the United States managed to involve the other NATO countries in the financial blockade of Poland. However, one must continue to remember that despite the pressures and suggestions to declare Poland insolvent emanating from some U.S. circles, Western financial and industrial circles, especially those in Western Europe, fear the consequences of such a step because it could bring down with it the collapse of many credit institutions. Thus, despite the initial refusal of the private Western banks to negotiate the postponement of Poland's payments in 1982, in the end the matter was resolved.¹⁵

There is also justification for hope that a means will be found to mitigate the NATO prohibition against furnishing new credits to Poland. In addition, Soviet credit aid should not be forgotten, which, as indicated by current experience, Poland can obtain in an especially critical situation.

Considering the potentials of the Polish and Soviet fleets and airlines, the announced and partially implemented sanctions in the area of flying and shipping agreements appear to be the least effective.

The U.S. economic situation, especially the high level of unemployment which at the end of 1982 was at about 10 percent of those able to work, as well as the foreign trade deficit which was estimated by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates to be \$40.6 billion in 1981, are limiting the effectiveness of the American sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union. According to this same source, the surplus in the current balance of payments, which was estimated to be \$2.4 billion in 1981, will change to a \$1.3 billion deficit in 1982.¹⁶

In the mid-1970's American economists had already charged that economic warfare conducted to realize political goals would harm the American economy.¹⁷ This was one of the main reasons for liberalizing this policy in subsequent years. The current American sanctions are costly to the economy at the micro level; American firms are losing orders to competing firms from other capitalist countries or European divisions of international American corporations, decreasing the U.S. export potential and evoking pressure from the proexport lobby against the administration. And at the macro level, the U.S. share of Polish imports and exports is falling to the benefit of Western Europe, Japan and the developing countries.

3. Undoubtedly the greatest disillusioning factor regarding the likely effectiveness of the American sanctions against Poland is that country's economic situation on the threshold of the 1980's. Poland's national income fell in 1979 by 2 percent; in 1980 by 6 percent; and in 1981 by 13 percent. An inevitable decrease (about 2 percent) still occurred even in 1982. This was an economic retrogression without parallel in any country in the postwar period. If one adds to this the high degree of dependence of industry on imports from the capitalist countries, the severity and thus the effectiveness of the sanctions appear to be extensive.

The problem of the severity and likely effectiveness of the latest American sanctions, however, should be examined from two aspects: the short-term and long-term.

In the short run, despite the fact that the sanctions were officially aimed at the "Polish military government," in fact they hurt the public most of all.¹⁸ It is estimated that as a result of the cutoff of American corn imports, on which 90 percent of broiler production was based, the supply of poultry to the market decreased by about 350,000 tons in 1982.

The withdrawal of fishing rights for the Polish fishing fleet will cost the Polish economy about \$70 million, decrease the catch by about 170,000 tons and in effect limit fish supplies to Polish consumers. The limiting of feed imports will also decrease meat production, and the reduced wheat imports made it more difficult to obtain flour.

Polish industry also experienced losses as a result of credit withholding. The purchases of spare parts and other components for the production of a

number of articles was limited; this included antibiotics manufactured in collaboration with American firms.

An especially difficult task is estimating the losses incurred by Polish exports as a result of the withdrawal of MFN status. However, based on the many American investigations of the 1970's, the following facts must be considered:¹⁹

--the withdrawal of MFN status means that the higher tariff rates of column No 2 of the American tariff schedule will be obligatory relative to Polish goods (column No 1 is for MFN status);

--the U.S. tariff schedule structure, which after all is similar to those of the other developed capitalist countries, is characterized by tariff rates that increase as the processing content of the goods increases; therefore, depending on the structure of Polish exports to the United States, the negative effects of the MFN withdrawal will be greater or lesser;

--the traditional Polish exports of ham and shoulders did not suffer; these continued to represent over 30 percent of our exports at the beginning of the 1980's (the tariffs in both columns are the same); the highest tariff rates are imposed on iron and steel exports as well as clothing and textiles.

Taking the above facts into consideration, one can attempt to estimate Polish losses in a twofold formulation: (a) in the first variant, it is assumed that Polish exporters will try to maintain their American market. Thus, in order not to decrease exports they will have to reduce prices on average about 20 percent. Thus, our export income will be reduced. If we assume that in 1981 Polish exports to the United States were worth \$365 million of which 2/3 represented goods affected by the withdrawal of MFN status, then one can estimate that our income will be reduced by over \$40 million which is less than 1 percent of our exports to the capitalist countries;²⁰ (b) if the assumption is made that our exporters will be unable to lower their prices because it would be unprofitable, then Polish exports to this market will decrease. Calculating its effects is very complicated. In the latest investigations cited above, the American experts calculated, for example that in the mid-1970's socialist countries exports were 29.2 percent less in 1974 and 37.5 percent less in 1976 as a result of non-MFN status (except Poland which at that time had MFN status).²¹ If we estimate that our exports to the United States in 1982 fell to a level of about \$200 million, we can assume that it will decrease an additional 25-30 percent or to a level of about \$150 million, as a result of MFN withdrawal.

In the long run, the degree of production substitutions in the Polish economy, considering the expansion of potential in the 1970's, is relatively high. The fact of the matter is that with the consistent implementation of economic reforms, economic mechanisms would be set in motion that would improve the effectiveness of management and thus the degree to which its potential is utilized.

Here, the thesis may sound paradoxical: that American economic sanctions can actually become one of the main factors operating in favor of a realistic, consistent implementation of a complete economic reform. Western credits and privileges in commercial trade allowed a high degree of economic growth to be achieved in the 1970's and increased the people's standard of living without the need in fact to realize the announced but merely feigned economic reforms which would have improved the degree of management effectiveness. Presently Western credits and privileges have ended, and the Soviet Union can and will be willing to designate only limited resources to support the Polish economy. Thus the only solution is a consistent implementation of economic reforms.

Thus, contrary to their desired goals, the American economic sanctions could in the long run lead to the stabilization of the Polish economy instead of its destabilization.

Another important effect of President Reagan's return to a policy of pressure against Poland which is contrary to the desired effect, is that Poland is linked more strongly with the economy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and the scope of Poland's independence from the West has increased, especially with regard to supplies of agricultural products.

The policy of economic warfare against the socialist countries, including Poland, that was used once before in conjunction with the containment-of-communism political doctrine during the so-called Cold War ended in failure. It damaged the economies of the socialist countries, but the damage was relatively minor. However, the expected political benefits did not materialize.

The completely different policy of favoring Poland and then Romania among the socialist countries by granting them MFN privileges that was applied from the end of the 1950's had the same political goals as those of the 1940's and 1950's. The development of the political situation in Poland after August 1980, especially the economic crisis and anarchy in the final months of 1981, appeared to bring the results expected in Washington. However, the introduction of martial law in Poland reduced the chances for political changes in accord with the interests of U.S. policy to zero.

The use of economic sanctions means that Washington placed too much emphasis on the concept of aggressive action regardless of the economic costs to the American economy. Its goal was to destabilize further the Polish economy which in effect was supposed to weaken the entire system of socialist countries.

Taking into consideration the objective conditions, it should be stated that presently they limit the effectiveness of using economic sanctions to realize political gains even more so than in the 1940's and 1950's. Therefore, also in relation to the economic sanctions of the Reagan administration against Poland, the conclusions of the American experts that were formulated at the beginning of the 1970's continue to be up-to-date, namely "that the aggressive policy of unilateral economic warfare that was designed to achieve containment, rebellion, polycentrism or reform should not be expected to bring any kind of foreseeable results. The trends of international and internal

policy are too strong and intricate, and the combined resources of the Eastern countries are too great to expect any degree of probability of success that political goals of that type could be achieved within the socialist world."²² "The communist countries are becoming an increasingly important force in the world economy regardless of the status of American East-West relations."²³

FOOTNOTES

1. T.A. Wolf, "New Elements in East-West Trade Policy," Berlin, 1974, p 4.
2. See I. Walter, "Die Einstellung der Vereingten Staaten zum Ost-West Handel und deren Implikationen fur Westeuropa," Aussenwirtschaft, 1974, p 80.
3. T.A. Wolf, op. cit., p 6.
4. Ibid. p 3.
5. T.A. Wolf, R.G. Hawkins, "Towards a New Policy for East-West Trade in the 1970's," Berlin, 1972, p 3.
6. T.A. Wolf, "East-West Tradeoffs," Berlin, 1974, p 9.
7. Z. Brzezinski, "Alternative to Partition," New York, Toronto, London, 1965, p 190.
8. They were presented in a paper by R. Kaufman of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress entitled "The Economic Policy of President Reagan's Administration Relative to Poland and the Socialist Countries" that was delivered at the Poznan Economic Academy on December 7, 1981.
9. See the interview of Poland's vice minister of foreign trade, TRYBUNA LUDU, 21 January 1982. Several dozen days later the permanent representatives of the block's member countries again considered the introduction of further restrictions, such as: abridging airline and shipping agreements; suspending bilateral agreements on commercial, technical, scientific and cultural exchanges, impeding credit and transfer of technology. Despite Washington's expectations, the results of this meeting were imperceptible.
10. T.A. Wolf, "East-West Tradeoffs," p 4.
11. The probability of such a situation developing fell in practice to zero after martial law was declared in Poland.
12. See NEWSWEEK, January 1982.
13. "U.S. Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's: A New Approach to New Realities," Washington pp 9 and 16.

14. RZECZPOSPOLITA, 8 December 1982.
15. On 3 November 1982 Witold Bien, vice minister of Poland's finances, signed an agreement in Vienna with Western commercial banks regarding payments falling due in 1982 that are not guaranteed. See TRYBUNA LUDU, 6-7 November 1982.
16. THE ECONOMIST, 7 November 1981.
17. T.A. Wolf, "A Note on the Restrictive Effect of Unilateral United States Export Controls," THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1973, No 1.
18. Above all, the concern here is about 1982 and eventually 1983.
19. See T.A. Wolf, "Effects of U.S. Granting Most Favored Nation Treatment to Imports from Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience," Berlin, 1974; J.E. Jelacic, "Impact of Granting Most Favored Nations Treatment to the Countries of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China," Washington, 1974; A. Elies, M.E. Searing, "A Quantitative Assessment of U.S. Constraint on Trade With Eastern Europe and the USSR: Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe," Washington, 1974; H. Raffel, M. Rubin, R. Teal, "The MFN Impact on U.S. Imports from Eastern Europe: East European Economies Post-Helsinki," Washington, 1977.
20. According to Department of State data cited in TRYBUNA LUDU, 13 October 1982.
21. H. Raffel, M. Rubin, R. Teal, op. cit., p 1407.
22. T.A. Wolf, R.G. Hawkins, op. cit., pp 39 and 40.
23. T.A. Wolf, "East-West Tradeoffs," p 21.

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KUBIAK SPEAKS ON PROGRESS OF CRISIS RESEARCH COMMISSION

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 17, 23 Apr 83 pp 1, 8

[Interview with PZPR Politburo member Hieronim Kubiak by Marian Turski; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Marian Turski: You are the chairman of a commission which was given the task of explaining circumstances and factors related to conflicts in socialist Poland's history as well as reasons for these conflicts. The commission was appointed at the 3d PZPR Central Committee plenum in September 1981, in accordance with the 9th Congress resolution. It was expected to complete its task before August 1982. Has the commission finished the investigation?

Hieronim Kubiak: No, it has not.

Turski: How long will it take?

Kubiak: That depends on what the 12th Plenum decides. Of course the commission's work pattern tasks are also factors. There are several possibilities. For instance, all the materials might be presented to the 13th Plenum (following an exchange of opinions at the upcoming plenum). It is also quite likely that the commission's final report will be presented to a national party conference scheduled for the end of this year. This is not a trick on our part; we are not trying to play for time....

Turski: Have you heard the rumor that the Politburo rejected several previous reports prepared by the commission, and that this is the real reason for the delay?

Kubiak: These are all fabrications which certainly originated outside Poland.

Turski: Has the commission gathered enough information to prevent future crises?

Kubiak: Who wouldn't want to reply "yes." I also cherished such hopes when the commission began work. The 9th Congress' decisions leave no doubts about this matter. The Congress' resolution (part I, point 10) instructed the commission to spare no effort in explaining all circumstances and factors, including personal responsibility, which led to previous tragedies. The Congress referred

mainly to the 1956 and 1970 developments. "The commission should undertake immediate efforts and, within one year, it should publish information about facts and conclusions they arrived at for the party and the state so that similar tragedies never again occur in the future." I cannot tell, of course, if we will manage to meet the "never again" demand but, I believe, we have made great progress.

Turski: Do the commission's findings allow you to tell whether or not Poland's fate is a repetition of crises?

Kubiak: I think we are not doomed to crises. I am not a historian but a sociologist, and this, perhaps, is the reason why I attribute less importance to changes in leadership. History, of course, is not made by anonymous crowds. Individuals have enormous opportunities to map out policies and to control their implementation, which is particularly important. But I would rather concentrate on processes rather than individuals.

Two regularities can be distinguished among the complex reasons behind Poland's political crises. The first is connected with the party's attitude toward the working class and, through this class, to the rest of society. The other concerns intra-party mechanisms, i.e., the nature of intra-party democracy, the intellectual climate, the openness of discussions before decisions are made, the atmosphere in which implementation of these decisions is monitored, the degree to which the entire party--including its basic organizations--participates in electing PZPR authorities, the control of these authorities and the role of collective bodies.

Opinion prevails in the PZPR that the entire party is responsible for the "never again" principle. We must not be overly idealistic, however. All this is very difficult and is subject to various fluctuations. But as long as all PZPR members do not stop participating in making and in monitoring decisions, as long as the intellectual climate within the party is open to reality, and as long as the party is an authentic working-class conscience, capable of predicting working-class unrest and detecting the reasons for it, there are guarantees that the "never again" demand can be met.

Turski: Isn't it more accurate to say "there would be guarantees...."

Kubiak: No, I think such guarantees do exist.

Turski: You said the [party'] attitude toward the working class is a crisis-generating factor. Since there should not be any taboo subjects let me ask if we are not being idealistic about the working class. Are we not repeating the mistake Polish communists made in the 1920's when they expected the majority of Polish workers to accept social revolution? These communists were unaware of the real state of the working class consciousness. Isn't this an important cognitive problem?

Kubiak: Yes, this is important not only from the point of view of scientific cognition but also for political methods. Any idealizing in this sphere is eventually directed against those who resort to it. Anyone who has lost contact with reality, no matter for what noble or humanitarian reasons, will

eventually face this reality himself and, of course, be hurt. The image of the Polish working class should not be oversimplified, nor should the number of workers be overestimated. Do not forget that during the inter-war period, blue collar workers totalled 9 percent of the population. We can presume today that the figure is 40 percent. The majority of these people are from the so-called "first-generation working class," which means that they were born and raised in peasant families.

For years we have assured today's working class that the state gives and does everything and is omnipotent. Do not forget Poland's working class is young in terms of age and from a sociological point of view. Apart from this, it is not at all homogeneous, which was illustrated, among other ways, by differences in workers' behavior after August 1980 depending on the size of the enterprises and the kind of industry in which they work.

The importance of the working class in the historical process can be comprehended provided all myths concerning the working class are abandoned and critical remarks about it are not avoided. Someone who resorts to cheap formulas and who wants to flatter the working class with words which put its vigilance to sleep does not need analyses but, at the same time, he abandons the role the party should play in the class it represents.

Turski: These arguments are connected with moral and political justification of the communists coming to power in Poland after World War II. The 9th Congress put an end to taboos concerning the birth of socialist Poland. We find it easier today to admit that the mid-1940's were a time when a minority seized power in Poland. The Polish left wing believed at that time that it was morally and politically justified in doing so because it was the only power capable of presenting a constructive program for the nation's recovery in the face of the international circumstances and alignment of forces which existed in the world at that time, when a national disaster was the only alternative. A realistic view of Poland involved in new alignments, the country's new frontiers and planned social reforms, were likely to make the new authorities credible even in the eyes of those who distanced themselves from them by political outlooks and emotions. Although the Polish consciousness was full of prejudice stemming from the time of Poland's partitions and conflicts with the neighboring countries, we can say today that the new authorities won the majority's support on many different levels. Crises most frequently occurred after a gap emerged between the state administration's actions and the public's emotions and needs. My question is: can examination of the previous crises explain this fundamental drama?

Kubiak: The year 1956 is particularly instructive as far as the process of attracting the majority of the public and of its downfalls is concerned. I can remember that year very well since I myself was just entering independent political life at that time. I can remember the streets and recognize myself in the crowd. I think disturbances were taking place at a time when the party ceased to be a political movement and transformed itself into a ruling institution. This was not only an error in the art of governing. Such dilemmas face the majority of (if not all) ruling parties, and Lenin pointed this out even before the [October] Revolution. In situations like this, restless people,

with their multifarious convictions and strivings, are being replaced by authorities who must run state power mechanisms. Analyses we have made indicate this dilemma cannot be eliminated unless an atmosphere of intellectual, moral and political discontent and an openness in intra-party life are always present. Institutionalizing party life and replacing the whole of the party by its sections or, in other words, substituting institutions for a movement, cannot be prevented if the movement itself does not claim its rights, if it does not defend its prerogatives, and if it does not make sensible use of party statutes.

Turski: Does this mean that lack of intra-party unrest is likely to extend these contradictions to the relationship between the party and society?

Kubiak: Such a danger does exist but the greatest threat is rooted inside the party. A ruling party, i.e., a political movement, is, in such situations, replaced by ruling groups. This contradiction does not mean, in this case, that the party and society are poles apart. Such a contradiction means that society, including the party rank-and-file, is against the party leadership. You have to understand this kind of drama in order to help devise appropriate preventive measures. Such an understanding also does justice to a vast majority of party members. Could anybody expect the PZPR, which was under such strong fire, and appeared so helpless, to show such enormous power and wisdom as to formulate everything that was said at the 9th Congress?

Some say the 9th Congress was proof of the PZPR's weakness. Personally, I think it was a manifestation of the party's political maturity, of its force, its agility, its close contact with society and its ideological adherence to the Marxist-Leninist principle.

Turski: We said that institutionalization of a political movement threatens many political systems. But bourgeois-parliamentary systems developed mechanisms which enable correction of the existing state of affairs or even a complete change....

Kubiak: ...By opponents from without.

Turski: In Poland, where the system is considered a variant of the one-party model, how can we create a sensory mechanism which would enable the party to develop an efficient instrument to control and prevent deformations in the situation where there is but one movement and supporters differ in their conceptions and position in the hierarchy?

Kubiak: As far as Poland's system is concerned--and in terms of the theory that this is a multi-party system with a single leading party--I support the opinion that the type of coalition (which applies not only to the United Peasants Party and the Democratic Party) which is currently emerging is an extremely important political process. I do not think we have to look for models in other systems to devise measures curing our own weaknesses.

I am convinced that the party, which reflects the moral and social unrest of the working class and, at the same time, exercises power through its elected collective bodies, is capable of forming an "intra-system self-opposition."

In situations where the party itself constitutes opposition, it appears not only as the ruling power, but also as a controlling force.

Turski: Appeals for party unity followed every crisis. Don't these appeals, which are quite natural and justified, pose a threat to the intra-party arguments and discontent we have mentioned before?

Kubiak: That depends on what you mean by intra-party unity. Those who insist that in order to play the role of "intra-system self-opposition" the PZPR should be the sum total of debate clubs, do not understand a thing about the nature of a political party. Appeals for party unity are appeals for uniting around the party's program and ideological principles from which this program derives. Unity means dedication to common goals; it is organizational unity.

The 9th Congress' program was not the work of a single or even several theoreticians (which has happened before). In fact it was formulated in an extremely unusual way by a host of PZPR organizations throughout Poland, who were in direct contact with all that was sane and wise in the post-August unrest shared by people inside and outside the PZPR.

I chaired the Resolutions Commission at the 9th Congress and remember the nights when myriad documents submitted by delegates were transformed into a single, uniform program.

All crises give rise to different assessments. Fortunately this is perfectly natural. There should be as many different assessments as possible, all of which should be thoroughly analyzed in order to preserve their most accurate and precious elements. If so, appeals for party unity mean that PZPR members should concentrate on implementing the jointly adopted program. During crises, appeals for unity also mean that order should be restored in the party. This also applies to ideology. But such order must not exclude thought. It should only uncover the undesirable elements alien to Polish tradition. All other appeals for unity would produce nothing but bureaucratic unity.

We should create an atmosphere in PZPR organizations which would make everybody speak up. We should act together in selecting prospective strategic goals, but we should also differ (since our experiences, knowledge and roads to the PZPR also differ) before a decision is made. This is natural, of course. The point is that all members should share the conviction they take part in decision-making, and all members must implement these decisions. This is the starting point for modern political consciousness.

Turski: Almost every other speaker at the Congress demanded structural changes. Do the commission's findings throw any light on this matter?

Kubiak: This demand, among other ones, was included in the PZPR statutes. Unfortunately it is sometimes easier to write laws than to observe them. Anyway, the party statutes guarantee proper functioning of intra-party structures....

The Congress demanded establishment of new state institutions, namely the Constitutional Tribunal and the Tribunal of State. I understand that these institutions

are necessary not only in setting accounts with the past, but mainly in serving the future and becoming an element of the political consciousness we want to create.

The new structures also include the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON], which is supposed to be an authentic social movement. It has room for the majority of people who were involved in Solidarity because of their commitment to Poland rather than to a non-socialist alternative. For this reason PRON offers an important opportunity to the nation.

Turski: The reasons why PRON has been only an opportunity so far are clear. First, people remember their experience with PRON's predecessors, such as the National Unity Front [FJN] which was either unable, or not allowed, to develop into a partner for decision-making centers. Second, in the present state of affairs, things simply cannot be different. We know the conditions and circumstances in which the leading role of the Polish Workers' Party [PPR], and then the PZPR, took shape. We also know about shortcomings in the way in which representative bodies have been shaped in Poland so far. Is it not therefore recommended, if not necessary, to encourage other--both smaller and larger--organizations to operate in Poland, beginning with hobby clubs, artistic associations, self-management bodies and local self-governing bodies?

Kubiak: Such

Kubiak: Such a need certainly exists. But I see a different problem with regard to the nationwide movement we are talking about. Many people whom I would not hesitate to call honest and noble have now, because of the winding roads of Poland's political life and previous tragic experience, chosen the attitude of a potter who wants to make a pot without dirtying his hands with clay.

This citizens' movement we are talking about cannot be imposed upon the people. The authorities' participation in this movement should be limited to an honest declaration that the movement has an enormous role to play in Poland's political system. It does not depend on the authorities whether or not PRON plays this role. It depends on the participants and on whether or not they renounce the "pass" attitude in poker games.

Turski: I know little about poker myself, but I do know that players not only have the right to "pass" but also to "see a hand."

Kubiak: To gain this right, however, one must start playing. At a meeting in the Mining and Metallurgy Academy in Krakow, some people told me that the "pass" approach stemmed from a bad experience in the past. I replied that, as long as there is at least a chance, the situation is optimistic even though people might let themselves be fooled again.

Turski: Let us return to the subject of the commission's work. Did it concentrate on typically Polish reasons for crises?

Kubiak: The commission proceeded to work with the conviction that it must explain both the weak and the strong sides in Poland's post-war history. This means that this history must be considered from an international perspective as well and that international factors must be examined. This is not sidestepping

the issue, but precondition. I am referring at this point only to the beginning, and not the final effects, of the commission's work. But it is awkward for the commission's chairman to talk about them when work is still in progress.

Turski: Let us then concentrate on your work methods.

Kubiak: We began by collecting source materials consisting of over two thousand printed documents about various contradictions, tensions and conflicts in Poland's post-war history....

Turski: Have you taken into account papers by people whom you consider to be absolute enemies?

Kubiak: All documents were analyzed. We tried to follow the principle that the agreements themselves were more important than their authors' intentions.

Turski: How extensive is the material you gathered?

Kubiak: There are tens of thousands of pages. We also examined unpublished materials, memoirs and a great number of letters and reports. We commissioned some alternative reports to help us answer our questions.

Turski: Can you name some definite examples?

Kubiak: Do not ask me to give names. As for some of the projects, the commission asked for reports on Poland's economic policy in the 1960's from both its authors and its past and present opponents. We wanted to learn contradictory points of view. They had to contradict each other not only because the authors' interests conflicted, but also because these people quite frequently follow a different set of values than those they apply to social policy.

That was the first step. We then divided ourselves into three groups and analyzed the materials dealing with the 1948-56, the 1968-70 and the 1976-80 periods. We also tried to analyze the results and to find those elements which may prove decisive in reaching conclusions. At that stage we discussed our findings with selected PZPR organizations and participants in the events which we were examining, mainly from Szczecin, Gdansk, Lodz, Katowice and Warsaw. The commission's members talked to scientists and workers from major industrial plants (e.g., the Warsaw FSO [passenger car factory]). They also participated in special conferences in Gdansk, Poznan, Krakow and Warsaw. I think the commission's findings must undergo further detailed examination. Studies such as this one must from now on become a permanent element of the social sciences to expand the knowledge of both the authorities and society.

The commission then tried to generalize its findings, and that was when it ran into entirely new problems.

Turski: Is the final report a summation of documents on each Polish crisis, or does it attempt to find a common denominator for them all?

Kubiak: It is both these things and more. Our aim is to examine Poland's history from 1948 until the present in order to detect the mechanisms leading to contradictions which determine Poland's destiny. We want to describe these mechanisms and to show that, despite various tensions and conflicts, the country developed. The final report will also contain a description of particularly tragic events in Poznan and the coastal cities. It will conclude with a several-hundred page section containing the commission's observations and conclusions.

Let me stress that nobody interfered with our work. This means that, to a great extent, whether or not the final report makes sense will depend on the commission members' intellectual powers and emotional endurance. I said "to a great extent" rather than "entirely" since the report will also be influenced by the condition of the source materials, the level of scientific studies and the present times.

Turski: Will the report also refer to the process of shaping the ruling elite in socialist Poland?

Kubiak: Yes, we analyzed the process of emergence of PZPR authorities and the cadre policy.

Turski: From what you have told me it appears that the final report will resemble a book on socialist Poland's recent history.

Kubiak: This is one of our major problems. We are unable to write a history of People's Poland or of the PZPR. Both books have yet to be written. It is also due to the absence of such books that the commission is sometimes forced to grope in the dark. Remember, the commission is not just composed of experts, fortunately.

Turski: Yet the membership list includes many specialists.

Kubiak: There are specialists working on the commission also. But quite often when an expert resorts to rhetoric to settle a difficult problem, a worker from the commission says he doesn't understand and asks for clarification.

Turski: We agreed that, although the final report will not be a book on socialist Poland's history, it will certainly be a contribution to historical studies. This is my greatest concern. As a historian who tries to popularize historical knowledge, I encounter many problems when attempting to publish materials on Poland's recent history. I am aware that these problems stem from the fact that politicians who decide about publications frequently want to prevent situations where the past would influence the present. Politicians are afraid of the associations and emotions that publication of historical texts referring to recent developments and unfinished chapters of history are likely to evoke, hence there are many taboo subjects, historical blanks and banned archive materials....

Kubiak: We had no problems with access to source materials, which does not mean we always managed to use them in the best way possible. I know there are many blanks which, in my opinion, derive from the conviction that it is easier to

conceal something than it is to tell the truth. Filling all these blanks will require years of slow and honest intellectual effort, which may evoke emotions afterwards but which must not be influenced by emotional attitudes. The commission will not fill all the blanks, but it will certainly reduce them. The materials it gathered will provide years of work to many a research institution. I hope scientists will be equal to this task and that the political situation in Poland will permit them to do so. In a situation where research on certain subjects is prohibited, politicians have no right to complain that scientists did not give them enough warning.

Turski: I am glad to hear that the commission had no problems in obtaining materials it wanted to examine. Is there a chance that the commission's findings will be presented publicly?

Kubiak: I think such a chance exists but the current level of our knowledge and the political situation will prevent this from being done all at once. I think that, instead of being a one-time event, this is going to be a longer process involving a kind of new political consciousness which will depend on both those who steer public life and on citizens.

CSO: 2600/829

ZIELONA 'GORA' REPORTS ON GORZOW PARTY COMMITTEE PLENUM

LD261200 Zielona Gora Domestic Service in Polish 0542 GMT 25 Mar 83

[Report by Stefan Wachnowski from Gorzow]

[Text] In his report on behalf of the Executive Board at yesterday's plenum of the Gorzow Voivodship Party Committee by the voivodship commander of the Citizens' Militia [MO], Col Lech Gosiorowski, dealt with antisocialist underground activities last year. Those were not exclusively leaflet actions, but also antistate demonstrations in the streets. Particularly on 31 August, scores of school pupils, including primary school children, had been engaged in antistate actions. Last year Gorzow Voivodship militia organs and security services liquidated 16 illegal groups, confiscated 6 printing machines and 40 other installations for duplicating leaflets and letters. This was only one current MO and security service activity during the martial law period.

The main effort has been to slow down a wave of common crime; from the total number of crimes committed in 1982, theft and breaking into social and private establishments predominate. The results of the prosecution apparatus over the period are considerable: for the first time in several years the index of crime has appeared to be lower than the national average, and the index of crime detection has risen to 84 percent. That is considerably higher than the national average. Thus, the achievements of the militia and security forces and the administration of justice apparatus in combating and slowing down crime in Gorzow Voivodship are considerable.

Nevertheless, it was stressed many times in the discussion, and Miroslaw Milewski, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, also stated that services called upon to combat crime cannot remain on their own. Commissions for individual crime prevention have died a natural death, people's councils commissions are not doing much, antialcoholic committees are not operating, the scouting traffic service has almost disappeared, and Volunteer Reserve of the Citizens' Militia enterprise organizations have weakened their operations.

We can still observe devastation in the sphere of social awareness, discipline and morality. Many people believe that the source of income must not necessarily come from work. Obviously the domestic and foreign enemy still

has considerable influence on shaping these kinds of attitudes, which among other things slows down the development of trade unions and workers self-management.

Not a great deal can be conveyed from yesterday's plenum in several minutes, and there is no room for many valuable thoughts that were contained in fifteen speeches in the discussion. It would be worthwhile to dwell longer on the extensive speech by Comrade Milewski and on the adopted resolution defining party actions for the future. I would like to end this report with the conviction expressed in the final speech by Florian Ratajczak, first secretary of the Voivodship Committee, that the restoration of socialist norms of living, based on the principles of social justice and personal dignity, and the prevention of all pathological and criminal signs are important tasks for the entire party, as an inspiration to all citizens, teachers and social organizations, with PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] at the head.

CSO: 2600/796

COMMENTATOR SCORES PZPR WEAKNESS, DEFENDS RENEWAL, DIALOGUE

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 10, 24 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Andrzej Werblan: "The Burden of the Past and Tomorrow"]

[Excerpt] Understanding what occurred between August 1980 and December 1981 is of considerable importance to the future.

Two positions were outlined in a discussion printed in POLITYKA. The first position: the course of events and their final result were, from almost the beginning, determined and possible to predict; the disposition of forces was not favorably formed for the authorities, and the powerful opposition, which was seized by Solidarity, systematically and consistently aimed at seizing power and changing the system with the encouragement and support of the imperialist countries interested in destabilizing socialism. Therefore, it was impossible to talk about dialogue and understanding. The second position tends to attach primary importance to those political and economic factors which in previous years, even in the decade preceding the crisis, determined the negative orientation of a large part of society toward the authorities. Consequently, without denying the existence and action of forces which are hostile to socialism or disregarding them, the basic motivations and historically productive substance of the movement for democratization, reform, dialogue and understanding is perceived.

As it frequently occurs in similar discussions, there is some truth in both positions; each of them describes one of the actual sides of reality. Assessment of the completeness and specific gravity and therefore the role of each factor is still a problem. From this point of view, another determining factor in the situation merits special consideration. It is the correctness governing the spontaneous and fortuitous movement of the masses.

Contemporary Marxism devotes little attention to this problem--less attention, in any case, than the matter merits. Yet it is possible to find, in the works of Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and Gramsci, a deeper and unbiased reflection on the phenomena of spontaneity in social life. The consideration of contemporary journalists and Marxist researchers is guided by the actions and conscious aims of leadership groups with the tendency to overestimate their role.

Obviously, each spontaneous movement of the masses has a magnetic attraction and displays the individuality of leaders. There are always the demagogues who are ready to express what the masses like the most. In a period of great social upheaval, people who go against the current of emotions and wishful thinking typical of such periods have a much more difficult time being heard.

Spontaneous movements indicate a natural tendency toward radicalism; the stronger it is, the narrower is its social base. Leaders participate in this, even though they are carried by the wave to a considerable extent. Those persons, who attempt to oppose it, usually sink and disappear from view.

The simplest, but also most deceptive, means of understanding social conflicts is teleological interpretation, which explains these conflicts as predetermined according to a set plan or scenario. The convenience of such an interpretation inheres in the fact that it permits one to sidestep the question of the causes of unrest and protest among broad social masses, and primarily of the sources of strength of the movement which developed as a result of this. Without answering these questions, the diagnosis will be uncertain, and the treatment will affect only the symptoms, not the causes.

The teleological theory of the genesis of social crises anesthetizes the intellect and awakens specters of revenge. It concentrates attention on how to foil the schemes of opponents rather than how to win over society.

This interpretation is superficial, especially with regard to social phenomena of great power and massive scope. Independent of the activities of leaders and organized groups, these phenomena always have spontaneous underpinning. Otherwise they would not have gone beyond the stage of isolated demonstrations or wretched putsches.

Previous interpretations of the sources and nature of the 1980-1981 Polish crisis have of necessity had a mainly political character and at least partially have had to be based on feelings rather than on research. More time is needed for a deeper Marxist analysis. It will have to explain precisely the survival, throughout these stormy months, of the great social, class and stratified collectivities of our nation. Common knowledge, supported by the results of opinion research, seems to indicate that the broadest social understanding found by the authorities during the crisis has been in the countryside. A significant portion of the peasantry has greeted the "urban revolt" and strikes with mistrust and apprehension. Rural "Solidarity" comprised no more than 10-15 percent of the peasants, and reached its greatest extent in the southern provinces, i.e., those with peasant-workers. Among the intelligentsia, the lines were clearly divided according to generation, with realism prevailing among the older generations and combativeness among the younger. Most deeply affected were the large industrial working centers. These observations do not run according to the stereotype. They must be researched and explicated if we want to remain on the grounds of classic Marxist analysis.

Historians will long debate the question of why the policy of understanding and the line of socialist renewal failed, since the latter were defined in the fall of 1980 and later on at the Ninth Congress. I am still convinced that the ideas of the Ninth Congress concerning the shape of socialist statehood, the model of the Leninist party, the directions of social and economic policy, not to mention the foreign policy principles which have remained unchanged since the inception of People's Poland, have been and will remain valid. They meet the needs of the situation, social expectations and real possibilities. On the other hand, the hope that these ideas would be defended and realized on the basis of the democratic mechanisms of political life has not been fulfilled. This hope was frustrated due to the shortsightedness of a portion of the leadership of Solidarity who, blinded by antisocialist resentment or an anarchistic attitude toward the state and the economy, fell under the influence of the Social Self-Defense Committee KOR and the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN]. The forces of socialist renewal turned out to be weak and immature, at variance with one another, insufficiently capable of undertaking bold activity befitting the situation. Defeatism and the failure to defend the principles of socialism on the one hand, and the resistance of conservative and dogmatic tendencies, which are inclined to change the entire matter into one of petty personal contests, on the other, also played no little part. Wide-ranging deficiencies in political culture have also weighed on the unfavorable evolution of events. Economic catastrophe had become a fact, and the political situation was rolling along toward the brink of civil war and the collapse of the state.

Perhaps, then, the efforts on behalf of dialogue and understanding were unnecessary? Perhaps we should have foreseen the inevitable course of events and sooner resorted to the strength of the state as the ultimate means of repressing anarchistic and antisocialist tendencies? This line of reasoning appears to be supported by reality, the necessity of introducing martial law when all other attempts at stemming the anarchization of the life of the state and averting the threat of civil war had failed. However, even while recognizing this necessity, it is difficult to agree with the conclusion drawn therefrom that the line of renewal and understanding was predestined to failure and thus made no sense, that its advocates should don cilices and sprinkle their heads with ashes, drawing conclusions "from the shattering of delusions and erroneous convictions."

In the first place, the fact that in the final analysis the Polish crisis turned out to be unresolvable without resorting to military means does not mean that this was the optimal solution or that it was preordained. It is difficult to deny that it would have been most advantageous if the forces of socialism had proven to be capable of harnessing anarchy and counter-revolution in a democratic political struggle, if they had managed to acquire effective allies in that part of society which fostered distrust toward demagoguery and which feared anarchy, out of patriotism and realism. The best forces in the party stood in favor of this, and Gen W. Jaruzelski persistently sought after this, proposing at almost the last minute the creation of a Council of National Agreement. More than once in social practice it has been necessary to take the "worse" road when the "better"

one turns out to be unreachable, which does not negate the sensibleness of the actions of those who fought for this "better" opportunity.

Lenin, the leader of the armed October uprising, throughout the spring and summer of 1917 voiced support for the idea of the peaceful development of revolution. He saw in this the most advantageous way to go from the point of view of the interests of the proletariat. He considered it the duty of the party to maintain this path as long as there was even a small chance of bringing it into reality. In choosing the course of armed uprising, he did not reevaluate this position. He chose another way because the most beneficial one had become impossible due to the balance of forces and social conditions.

Dogged insistence on a line of understanding and on political methods in the struggle to overcome the crisis have contributed to the fact that, when the Military Council for National Salvation decided to bring the soldiers out of the barracks, the necessity of this decision was recognized not only by those who had from the beginning supported such a solution for various reasons, or who saw no other way out, but also by many of those who believed in the opportunity for understanding based on socialist renewal, and who had sadly accepted the fact that this understanding had become unrealizable in the conditions which existed before 13 December.

Ultimately, the period between August and December not only brought on a sharpening of the crisis, but also proposals for changes and reforms of great significance. Along with the bad experiences, history will record much that is positive from this period, both for the Polish United Workers Party and its Ninth Congress, and for Solidarity, whose balance sheet is differentiated, as was the composition of its ranks.

We must cast aside that which is bad and anarchic, and salvage the positive achievements of these 15 months.

The experiences of the recent crisis and earlier crises show that it is self-deluding to expect an improvement in the situation as a result of ordinary changes in the governing team. December 13 did not invalidate the truism that what is necessary for lasting improvement is the restoration in politics of due respect for the objective laws of social development, the introduction of economic reform, the democratization of methods of exercising authority, the guarantee of autonomy for the trade movement and of self-government of academic and cultural life, and the institution of effective social control. Anarchization deformed and impeded the indispensable reforms, making the struggle for power the number one concern. Martial law has settled this struggle, but has created an ambivalent situation with respect to the question of reforms. It has facilitated the passage and introduction of economic reform in the area of price policy and enterprise autonomy. It has checked the frenzy of strikes, which has allowed us instead to obtain a growth in production in raw materials industries and industries which are not dependent on imports. The constitutional representative authorities are carrying on normal and active work. However, martial law has forcefully suspended or limited many areas of democratic activity, including worker self-government and internal party democracy.

This does not mean that the opportunities are lost. Reforms have not been renounced, but in many areas we must begin anew and in a different way, with greater caution and imagination.

A cessation of democratization would mean the revival of the arbitrary-command methods of exercising authority which lay at the root of previous errors in policy, the demoralization of cadres, loss of contact with reality and of ties with society.

The recent crisis has revealed with greater clarity than ever before the insufficiencies in awareness in our society, the weak feeling of statehood and social discipline, the lack of realism in understanding national interests and international dependencies, and above all the particular ease with which people succumb to demagoguery and present the state with demands that are impossible to satisfy, and so become destructive. These weaknesses cannot be conquered by propaganda. The feeling of statehood, political culture and an understanding of economic laws are born and disseminated in the process of participating in government, participating factually, on the basis of clear rules and a stable legal system.

One often hears the demand that the disastrous repetition of crises be avoided, that we do what is necessary to make the present crisis the last one. Every journalist has written something along these lines at least once, no doubt in good faith. However, this is a classic example of wishful thinking [given in English]. The gullibility with which this type of wish is accepted is striking, if one considers that it is contradicted by the whole of past history, both remote and recent. Knowledge of the past teaches us that political crises are inevitable, if by this concept we understand the inefficiency of economic and social policy, the fall in popularity of the groups who created and implement this policy, and the consequent necessity of changes both in policy and in politicians. The hope of avoiding crises, as understood in this manner, must be considered social utopianism. For a "perfect" social policy, capable of coping with all demands, is not possible. The reasons why this is so in a society divided into antagonistic class oppositions are clear. However, a society composed of working classes which are not antagonistic toward one another is also not free of crisis-generating elements. Even the most homogeneous collectivities--such as the working class--are formed out of different interests and competing needs. Each specific policy entails the satisfaction of some of these needs at the cost of others. Even if there were no other causes, the very differentiation and changeability of social conditions make it so that every political idea sooner or later gets worn out and exhausts its creative possibilities. Mistakes made by politicians can obviously sharpen these processes significantly, just as wise and far-sighted actions can soften them.

CSO: 2600/828

PROVINCIAL PRON ACTIVITIES NOTED

Radom Pre-Congress PRON Discussions

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 6 Apr 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by M. Oleszczuk: "In Radom Province--Before and After the National PRON Congress; They Are not Ignoring the Thorny Problems"]

[Text] Pre-Congress discussions are continuing in all PRON cells in Radom Province. Meetings were conducted by the lowest cells, at workplaces and institutions and in the rural and urban areas. Presently, conferences of gmina [parish], urban-gmina and municipal councils are being held. The fruits of the discussions on the declaration and statutory rules are plentiful. It is emphasized that the movement must be of an open nature, be credible and operate in a continuous manner. In the materials preceding the second provincial conference, the emphasis was especially strong on the participation of citizens in wielding power and social control.

It should be stated that the ideological-program declaration and the draft statute have been accepted as a whole. Attention is focused on proposals to change some formulations or to revise specific sections. There is also a proposal to expand the declaration to include specific entries. Among other things, it includes fragments on the role of the movement vis-a-vis the approaching elections. A suggestion has been made to include an entry in the declaration on the place of youth in the country's socioeconomic life. Popularization of PRON's ideas is an important matter. The first issue of the bulletin to be issued by the Radom Province [RW] PRON will appear shortly. In the discussions, attention was devoted to the need to develop a social policy system that would equalize the social disproportions between the rural and urban areas.

As a result of the campaign in Radom Province, a number of actions have already been taken to resolve some of the most serious problems, including the creation by individual cells of consulting groups on youth affairs and forming a service group to be associated with the RW PRON to mediate and resolve the many important problems of the citizens. For example, in Drzewica local activists marked with signs and dangerous locations on the roads and properly illuminated the streets. The question of coal sales to pensioners and retirees and nursing personnel during work-free Saturdays

was settled. In Solec the problem of uncultivated land was taken up. PRON activists in Jastrzeba distributed more of the absetic tile to farms that lost them during last year's windstorm. Also, attention was concentrated everywhere on proper services to citizens by state administrators and offices, on the functioning of trade and units providing agricultural services. The latter is especially important now in the rural areas because of the ongoing spring campaign.

Delegates from the entire region met on 8 April at the Second Provincial Conference in order to sum up the results of activities to date and to approve the proposals for the draft declaration and statutory rules. Among the 250 delegates at the provincial conference, a group of 26 representatives of the movement from Radom Province will be selected for the First PRON Congress.

PRON's Mieczyslaw Augustyn

Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 2 Mar 83 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Mieczyslaw Augustyn, director of the CARITAS Office in Pila and member of the Provisional PRON National Council, by Anna Forecka; time and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Why did you get involved in this movement?

[Answer] I am a Catholic activist, and the social teachings of the Church obligate a believer to participate actively in social movements. In view of the great variety of perils in Poland, we must be present wherever any type of good work is attempted. As Catholics we have varied experiences in contacts with the national government, but we are especially obligated by the necessity to overcome ill feelings and to undertake joint efforts to improve life. The primate's response in approving the formation of the new movement also was a great incentive to undertake such activity. Finally, I do not know how to be indifferent to reality. As a Catholic and a Pole, I believe it is my moral duty to participate in public life. The concern here is not only about PRON but also about social life conceived as widely as possible. It is a special mission which should guide us vis-a-vis social organizations and institutions having the opportunity to do any kind of good work.

[Question] And does PRON provide this opportunity?

[Answer] I think so, and one must take advantage of this opportunity. At the same time I would like to state that I was attracted by those assumptions of the movement that support a tolerance of world views and dialogue as a form for national understanding and its integration.

[Question] What is your view of the participation of young people in PRON?

[Answer] I believe that PRON should be a kind of tribune for young people, especially those who do not identify with any of the active youth organizations and who were politically disillusioned by the ineffective Solidarity program. There are many such "castaways" among my generation. In PRON, young people should have an opportunity to apply and to frame their views. This is actually the place and not elsewhere for people with varying viewpoints because PRON is a platform for people to understand one another; it is the essence of the movement. If we all were of one mind then this movement in general would not be needed. Young people should also have an opportunity to influence their generation via PRON. However, I want to say--at least it is my experience--that so far PRON has not created this opportunity. For example, not too long ago I proposed to hold meetings with young students; however, this project was never realized despite the verbal support of the responsible authorities.

[Question] Regarding that, what do you think is the role of youth organizations in this movement?

[Answer] In no way is it any different from the role other organizations that announced a desire to participate are supposed to perform. They should be cocreators of the program of the PRON cells, pointing out in the program those problems whose resolutions require PRON help. At the same time, however, these organizations should participate knowingly in the realization of this program as a whole.

[Question] You are one of a few young people who sit on the Provisional PRON National Council.

[Answer] Unfortunately there are only a few young people on the Provisional PRON National Council and in PRON councils at the lower levels. It is true that I am one of those who was in the movement almost from the very beginning, for which I am reproached by some people, especially at the personal level. In a way they are dubious of such activity.

[Question] Do you believe this movement is effective?

[Answer] It is not a matter of faith. No social movement is self-generating. It is created by people, and how it will function will depend on their fervor and know-how. A movement in itself is no guarantee that it will function well. Without a specific program and legal rights, it is now considered to be just another invention of the authorities.

[Question] Some people actually think that way.

[Answer] Unfortunately that is so even though many examples are known where citizen committees, bearing various names but all having the same goal, formed spontaneously in many circles even before martial law was declared. I often hear the complaint that PRON is an artificial creation of the authorities. I believe this results from the fact that many committees of salvation and then PRON committees were formed through the initiatives of party members or social organizations having the same world view, who,

on the need of the moment, reacted the most quickly. Often they were intelligent people of great influence. However, there were some who were not trusted by their closest associates.

[Question] Much is said about the autonomous character of PRON, of its independence from the state administration. Is this really true?

[Answer] The situation improved dramatically for the better the moment the PRON declaration was announced. It then became obvious that this movement is a permanent form of public life which must be taken into account. The status of our movement has increased greatly, and we are treated by the local administration and political authorities as partners in resolving the most serious problems. Today PRON's voice is being heard, and we are consulted regarding decisions even though there still are times when decisions are made in contravention to our stand.

[Question] It seems to me that the legal rights of this movement are quite nebulous.

[Answer] It is true that PRON does not have and does not seek legal rights from the authorities because it should not have them. It should operate as an organized public opinion, using its influence to realize a superior goal: the introduction into our life of the principles of social understanding in the most important matters concerning our immediate surroundings, the region or the country.

[Question] But even the conspicuous expression of your stand may turn out not to be effective enough. Should not this movement have certain legal rights?

[Answer] I only said that it will not have official legal rights. But it will have other rights. In all probability--because it is still under discussion--PRON will influence the selection of candidates for representative organs and thus against those council members and deputies who for various reasons are not fulfilling the expectations of their electorates; by means of its vote of no confidence, PRON can express itself and even take away a mandate.

[Question] The universality of this movement is frequently discussed. However, it is hard to imagine that everyone would belong to PRON. Do you think that membership in PRON should be limited in some way?

[Answer] There should certainly not be any formal limitations. After all, PRON is a social movement open to everyone except, obviously, enemies of our principles of government. A requirement that movement members should be active, however, is a natural limitation. In joining, everyone should know what he wants to do in PRON. For example, I have always been most interested in the state's social and family protection policies; it is in these areas that I devote most of my attention and above all concentrate my activities.

[Question] PRON's program is still in development. What do you think should be its primary goal?

[Answer] It is anticipated that the program will clearly formulate the movement's strategic goals. Here I am thinking about the democratization of our social and political lives, the preservation of a dialogue as a means of achieving an understanding between society and the government. Realizing these goals would be the best guarantee that the serious crisis of 1980 will not reoccur in the future.

PRON's Prof Wiktor Pawlak

Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 17 Mar 83 p 3

[Interview with Prof Wiktor Pawlak, chairman of the PRON TRW [Provisional Provincial Council] Program Commission, by Andrzej Luczak; time and place not specified]

[Text] Many people believe that PRON provides an opportunity to overcome one of our present shortcomings: the social crisis, unsatisfactory citizen action, and a lack of realistic optimism in its view of the future. As a movement and not an organization, PRON wants its operations to be based on public opinion, having the same character as the people who are involved in propagating its ideas. In the following interview, we wish to acquaint the reader with a profile of one of the animators of this social conscience.

[Question] Professor, why have you become active in PRON?

[Answer] I was invited to join by the TRW which was then being organized. I responded positively because I believe that in difficult situations one should take definite action and not assume a waiting position hoping that somehow the problems will be resolved on their own. I believe PRON has created an opportunity for the public to influence the functioning of the state apparatus which, I believe, can lend itself to the rise of a social force that is involved in working for the good of our fatherland.

The role of social action is very important. I have observed its effects when I returned to Poznan from a hellish concentration camp at the end of the war. The remembrances of that period convinced me that I should become active, especially if the new form of organization provides an opportunity to influence the selection of specific tasks and means for their realization, in these present, difficult times that have been brought about by various social, economic disturbances and the excessive use of bureaucratic centralism.

[Question] Much hope is being placed in this movement. At the same time, however, public skepticism is just as great. What action do you believe should be taken to popularize PRON's concepts?

[Answer] Achieving wider public acceptance of the movement is a specific process which should be presented such as to convince and attract those who are skeptical of our work to join in our activities. The opponents of this movement can be convinced only by actions that will reflect the influence of the PRON movement on administration actions and the initiation of actions vis-a-vis matters about which a positive social climate exists and a conviction that their realization will be a permanent achievement in current social life.

[Question] In observing the development of the movement, I believe there is a disquieting tendency that the ideas propagated by PRON carry relatively little weight among young people.

[Answer] This is caused by the rather too emotional approach of young people to specific Polish problems, by a lack of realism vis-a-vis social action which was represented in the serial entitled "The Longest War In Modern Europe."

The current economic difficulties which are causing an increase in private speculators [?prywatnosci] and in people seeking special privileges, which in our condition is real, are also of significance. I believe that the process of winning over young people will take a long time. It will be effectively hampered by the day to day worries. The attitudes relative to young people should be revalued in the social arrangement as a whole. It was not too long ago that we were the only country which simply did not take our youth organizations seriously, for which we are now reaping a bitter harvest. Not only were there frequent changes of names, but a sense of stability was not promoted, which is very important to us because we want to get involved in something.

The process of inculcating PRON's ideas among young people can be realized only when this movement treats youth as a real partner. The situation will certainly change when a sympathetic attitude relative to youth affairs and problems is established and also when it is accepted that young people acknowledge honest work and a straightforward relation to their own problems.

[Question] I do not know if you will agree with me, Professor, but I believe that what counts today most of all are hard facts, problems that are resolved positively or a definite time period in which these problems will be resolved. The Pstrowski epoch, during which many affairs were treated on the basis of ideals and, frequently, promises, is probably gone for good. If PRON wants to win wide acceptance, it should acquiesce to this scheme or apply itself to these problems by proposing alternative solutions. If we assume the first variant, what would be the chances of PRON executing its resolutions in this scheme?

[Answer] Much will depend on the influence that we will be able to acquire. All participants in this movement as well as all organizational cells must promote this influence. In case definite tasks are undertaken, the social climate must be taken into consideration, around which is shaped the material

and technical conditions necessary for its success as well as the sympathetic treatment by the administrative and economic apparatus. In this area, support by political organizations as well as interested social organizations is necessary. The undertaking of unrealistic tasks as well as the torpedoing of a raised problem for no good reason will work against public acceptance of PRON's ideas.

The more support or influence we can gain among the people, the more important will our voice be.

In the process of achieving this goal, our organizational structure is not without significance. It is true that there are provincial councils as well as a national council, but all cells are independent--we are, after all, a movement. We believe that in the not too distant past we raised our heads a bit too often, listening as to what will be said from "above" regarding our activities. We were anxious to be flattered and slapped on the back. Now this must change; we must lower our heads and look below where the people and their problems are. We must deserve their positive opinions of us.

[Question] Very likely the last question concerns the most fundamental problem: raising the people's political culture to a higher level. What action do you intend to take in this area, and will it be included in the movement's program for Poznan Province that is now being developed?

[Answer] The problem of improving the social and political culture is in the PRON WR [Provincial Council] program as a guiding principle. The promulgation of political culture requires the good will of both sides: those raising the issues and those providing the answers. Individuals giving replies to posed questions should give evidence of a higher social maturity as well as political culture. We must absorb social and political culture through experience. It is necessary because we propose to conduct a dialogue with the people, who continue to assume a position of some passivity and who at times expect resolutions to problems that are a bit too showy without considering if they will lead to concrete results.

An integral part of political culture is social action which we should encourage incessantly, turning to individual social groups with pleas to submit proposals that later on should be reflected, directly or indirectly, in the established plans on programs of action. First of all the stature of representative organs should be raised and that which they propose should be publicized.

I do not think that accepting certain proposals and presenting them as one's own ideas or achievements is the best method. In our own and the public's interest, our outlook must always be fresh because nothing can so weaken the effectiveness of an action as to be harnessed with stereotypes and to tread hackneyed paths. Thus we will continue to seek paths of activities until the time knowledge becomes universal, one of these paths will lead us to the specified goal.

Przemysl PRON Conference

Rzeszow NOWINY in Polish 17 Mar 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by wab: "The PRON City Conference in Przemysl; There is Room in This Movement for Everyone"]

[Text] In Przemysl province's PRON cells, the discussion are revolving about the drafts of PRON's declaration and statutory rules. Elections are also taking place to select delegates for the PRON provincial convention and for the PRON congress. In this region, the pre-Congress gmina and city PRON conferences are in their final stages. Yesterday (16 March) PRON's city conference took place in Przemysl, in which 90 delegates from PRON plant and residential cells as well as activists in the still-existing OKON participated.

Stanislaw Wilk (Christian Social Association) said: "As PRON activists, our opinions will be respected if our actions will give voice to human problems and troubles. Thus we must undertake those projects that systematically broaden our social base in order to mobilize into action the mechanisms of democratic authority and to integrate society to overcome the socio-economic crisis."

In his speech, Bronislaw Swierbut, PZPR member and retired railroad worker, stated emphatically: "It is actually our movement that should be instrumental in eliminating social pathology and everything that vexes us daily. Above all PRON's activities should be directed toward creating and observing the foundations for social justice."

Janina Buczko of the LKP [League of Polish Women] City Administration, among others, said: "During the discussions on the drafts of PRON's declaration and statutory rules, the activists of our organization promised to increase efforts to influence the patriotic attitudes of women and youth and to instill a sense of responsibility for performing their work and obligations. Participation in PRON cells also is a manifestation of respect for honest work and human effort, social discipline and good management, and a decisive show of opposition to the phenomenon of social pathology."

Polish women are fervent patriots, desiring peace and understanding. Despite differences in world outlooks, they are united in a common goal--the fatherland.

During the course of the discussion, which was diverse and controversial and which inspired a report presented by the chairman of the PRON Provisional City Council in Przemysl, Jan Orlos, in which it was emphasized that there is room in PRON's ranks for every citizen regardless of his world view. In the fields of social welfare activities there is room for all people of good will, who are patient and consistently aim toward the desired goal. Dr Jozef Galant, the chairman of the Provisional Provincial Council who attended the conference, said; "PRON provides an opportunity to express one's thoughts; to combat insensitivity, bureaucratism and all evil; and to make it possible to improve the system of government."

The PRON city conference selected 19 delegates for the provincial convention and 3 delegates for the PRON congress, namely Stanislaw Wilk, Christian Social Association; Romuald Boryslawski, SD; and Jan Orlos, PZPR. The participants in yesterday's deliberations included, among others, the following: Leslaw Chowanski, PZPR KW secretary; Stanislaw Sobczuk, first secretary of the PZPR KM; and Boguslaw Pruchnik, mayor of Przemyśl.

11899

CSO: 2600/728

EMIGRE DAILY REPRINTS UNDERGROUND REPORT ON CENSORSHIP

London DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA in Polish 5 Apr 83 p 4

[Text] Even though martial law has been suspended, the censorship continues in People's Poland as if the "war" lasted without an interruption. Below we reprint information on this topic from the underground TYGODNIK MAZOWSZE No 38.

The censorship clearly increased at the end of November. Some attribute this to talks which Glowczyk had in Moscow with Zamyatin who is responsible for the propaganda of the bloc. Thus, not counting minor suppressions, in one issue along (No 43) of POLITYKA six whole articles were dropped.

A False Picture

In general, the actions of the censorship are directed towards elimination of any doubts or corrections of the image which the authorities have created for themselves. There were no strikes and there were no demonstrations. In POLITYKA all portions which concerned demonstrations were eliminated from the martial law chronicle based on a Polish Press Agency communique. The working class is with the government. The censor's rewrite of D. Kedzierski's report on Frasyuniuk's trial is typical" the sentence "Frasyuniuk was informed about martial law by the railroad workers" was changed by the Main Office to read: "He found out about the martial law on a train." In Osmanczyk's text from PRZEGLAD TECHNICZNY [Technical Review] in the sentence: "An alternative for the reality of crisis is the building of democratic socialism," the word "democratic" was replaced by the word "real."

Economic Reform

Any criticism of the system of economic reform as well as even the most innocent attacks on the economy-managing center are prohibited: any criticism of circumstances which make it impossible for authentic workers' self-management to come into being is cut out; any mention or information about foreign trade or about the change in structure of the Sejm is removed. The economic situation of CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance) and of each peoples democracy country are carefully monitored. From POLITYKA No 43 J. Kleer's text about the GDR crisis was removed. The Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth can be written about only according to set formulae. Any serious references to August '80 are impossible. A demand was made of the chief editor of RADAR that besides a text which stresses the positive values of the August revolution he would publish as a counterbalance a commentary about the counter-revolution and the activities of the extremists.

Black List

Again just like before August there exists a black list of names which are not permitted to be published. RADAR dropped M. Krassowska's review of a new edition of S. Baranczak's DZIENNIK PORANNY [Morning Journal], P. Bratkowski's review of Kornhauser's little volume "Hurra" and a sketch by Peczak about J. Glowacki's prose.

The censors have their own ways of dealing with the stubborn ones. Blackmail: the censorship proposes that the editorial board itself should delete the controversial caption, otherwise the text will be removed in toto. Castration: the censor cuts out exactly that much of the article for it to lose its original sense (in "Technical Review" there were eight interventions into the feuilleton of M. Radgowski; one-third of M. Monko's article report about triple authority having been abolished: that of the secretary, that of the director and that of the militia commandant, all in one of the villages. The deferment: the censor promises that the text will be published later on in a while--it frequently means that it has been "frozen" forever.

Reprints

The censorship intervenes in texts and information which appeared in other magazines already during martial law. In PRZEGLAD TECHNICZNY, the reprinting from the monthly WIES WSPOLCZESNA [Contemporary Village] was questioned because of the following sentence: "If expenditures on armaments were to be reduced, by 10 percent, then during three years it would become possible to solve the problem of agricultural means of production."

Books

Book publishing houses note the interference of censorship into the books of authors with famous names (in accordance with decree of 1981--four dots in square brackets). On the other hand, the less known authors are pressured to drop the questioned parts under a threat that the book will not be published. An so "Ossolineum" terminated the contract with a historian Czaplinski (posthumously) because the heirs did not consent to insignificant interventions. When the editorial board insists on indicating deleted passages, it has to fight it out with the censorship for each dotted part separately. In WIEZ [Bond] it was at first agreed to mark eight deleted poems of A. Szmidt by one bracket only.

9971

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PROVINCIAL PRON ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Lublin Region Pre-Congress PRON Campaign

Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 22 Mar 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by sna: "The First Stage of Pre-Congress PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth) Campaign has Ended"]

[Text] The first stage of pre-congress PRON campaign has ended in our region. Meetings and conferences took place in all basic units. Voivodship conferences will take place during the first half of April and the First PRON Congress will take place from May 7-9.

In Biala-Podlaska, Chelm, and Zamosc voivodships delegates to the congress will be chosen at voivodship conferences. In Lublin voivodship the delegates will be chosen at regional meetings, which are beginning this week. In this voivodship the first PRON meetings will take place 24 March in Lubartow.

Discussions taking place at the present stage of the pre-congress campaign are animated and touch on many subjects. Much attention is given to the PRON ideological-programmatical declaration, the movements principles, tasks, and objectives, and the organization's future functions within our political system. Current problems and afflictions of both the country in general and particular communities are also discussed. Of course, it would be difficult to imagine a discussion in a rural community that would overlook shortages in basic production supplies for agriculture.

All participants of pre-congress meetings and conferences agree that, since the PRON is a spontaneous movement, it is of fundamental importance to give it a program that would express views of its members and concentrate all progressive social forces interested in the welfare of the country and the nation. The participants emphasized that the declaration, whose text was made public, proposes that the PRON concentrate on such activities as making governing methods more democratic, creating social premises for making our public life more democratic, increasing people's influence on activities of state bodies, and both preparing and conducting elections to representative bodies.

Czestochowa Region PRON Delegates

Katowice TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 18 Mar 83 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Let Us Build in Peace;" passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] A conference of delegates representing PRON units of Czestochowa voivodship took place yesterday, 17 March. It was the last one in a series of PRON reporting-election meetings.

A total of 30 delegates were elected at the meetings that took place in the voivodship's seven regions and in Czestochowa. The delegates will represent over 4,000 citizens who are active in over 200 units operating in sociopolitical communities and gminas of the region.

/During both the meetings and the elections the movement's following basic principles were affirmed: the movement's autonomy, freedom of opinion, and its democratic character./ During the meetings much attention was given to issues concerning particular communities, the PRON statutory principles, and its declaration. It was stated that this movement of the national understanding should become an organization that does not just unite all Poles, but even more so, it will be a forum at which all citizens can reach an understanding concerning small matters as well as issues important for the country and the nation as a whole.

A meeting authorized by PRON signatories, took place in Katowice. The implementation of the idea of national understanding was discussed at the meeting. The following officials participated in the meeting: Jan Grzegorzczak, secretary, ZSL Voivodship Committee; Wieslaw Gwizdz, secretary, PZKA [Polish Catholic Social Union] Voivodship Board; Wieslaw Nowicki, chairman, PRON Voivodship Committee; Jerzy Rusecki, secretary, SD Voivodship Committee; deputy Jan Waleczek, chairman, "PAX" Society voivodship chapter; Ryszard Wasik, secretary, ChSS [Sport Equipment Sales Center] Voivodship Board; and Jan Zielinski, secretary, PZPR Voivodship Committee.

Views concerning elections of delegates to the First PRON Congress, which are now taking place in the movement's basic units, were exchanged at the meeting. Information on activities of the PRON declaration signatories striving to build national understanding, was given as well.

It was determined at the meeting that PRON members should strive to increase the PRON influence on those citizens who are not party members, but are interested in the idea of reaching national understanding, even though they do not directly work for it. It was stated that honest and direct talks on subjects interesting the whole society serve the idea of national understanding. Such talks would allow all those who strive for it to find their own place in the PRON movement while retaining their political identity.

Elblag Province PRON Meeting

Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 7 Mar 83 p 1

[Article by sw: "In the National Interest"]

[Text] A plenary meeting of the PRON Provisional Provincial Executive Council [TWRW] took place in the Voivodship Office in Elblag last Saturday. The following representatives of political and administration authorities participated in the meeting: Jerzy Prusiecki, first secretary, PZPR Voivodship Committee; Franciszek Socha, chairman, ZSL Voivodship Committee; Stanislaw Baranski, chairman, SD Voivodship Committee; Ryszard Swiecicki, chairman, Voivodship People's Council; and Col Ryszard Urlinski, governor. Two matters were discussed: PRON organization and pre-congress campaign and the tasks concerning the campaign. The data presented at the meeting showed an increase in public support for the PRON. There are 200 units and local councils of the PRON and 3,900 members in Elblag voivodship. The voivodship PRON conference, scheduled for 7 April 1983, will be preceded by regional conferences. Seven conferences are scheduled to take place in the voivodship's large centers. It is already known that the PRON will be represented at the Congress by 18 delegates from Elblag voivodship.

A discussion, which initiated the pre-Congress campaign, concentrated on the PRON principles, its statute, organizational matters, and issues that are of fundamental importance to the future of our country.

The conference was chaired by the PRON TWRW Chairman, Col Ryszard Szkolnicki.

Braniewo PRON Regional Conference

Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 23 Mar 83 p 1

[Article by b: "Before the PRON Countrywide Congress"]

[Text] Regional conferences are currently taking place in Elblag voivodship. Yesterday such a conference took place in Braniewo. Almost 90 representatives of PRON organizations participated in the conference. They represented seven regional administrative districts, such as Orneta, Frombork, Pieniezno, and Ploskinia. Henry Dombrowski, deputy chairman, PRON Elblag Voivodship Interim Executive Council, participated in the conference. Other participants included Tadeusz Osko, secretary, PZPR Voivodship Committee, and other representatives of voivodship political and administrative authorities.

After Stefan Wisniewski from Braniewo and Kazimierz Borowski from Lelkowo presented their reports, there was a discussion. Matters that are important to all Poles were discussed. For example, Wladyslaw Mankut from Pieniezno pointed out that an understanding should be reached among

our country's citizens as soon as possible. Moral rebirth is also necessary. Jan Krolikowski spoke about the need to preserve the dignity of our nation and citizens. We have only one country and we all have to preserve its good name. We all have to work for the common good. Nothing can be accomplished without honest work.

Antoni Wolocko from Braniewo, a 70-year-old pensioner, spoke with feeling about the post-war effort to remove ruins and debris and rebuild recovered cities and villages, including Braniewo.

During the conference a delegate to the PRON congress was elected. He is Mieczyslaw Szczygiel--a young farmer from Ploskinie gmina. The conference also approved the list of delegates to the Voivodship PRON Conference, elected in cities and gminas of the voivodship. Resolutions determining PRON tasks for the immediate future were adopted.

9959

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ROMANIA

KARL MARX'S VIEWS ON ROMANIA DISCUSSED

Bucharest CONTEMPORANUL in Romanian 25 Mar 83 pp 3, 4

[Article entitled: "Karl Marx and the Romanians"]

[Text] It has been 100 years since the death of Karl Marx, the founder, along with Friedrich Engels, of the unified revolutionary concept about the world and society of the working class and its political party.

His prominent personality and his vast works of revolutionary thinking and struggle were recognized early on in our country, with the Marxist ideas being accepted and creatively applied to the specific and historical conditions of Romania and against the democratic, progressive and materialistic background of Romanian thought. The programs themselves of our revolutionary movement, outlined even back in 1872 and clearly formulated and developed during the following years, are an eloquent proof of the thorough accomplishments of the socialist movement in Romania regarding the fundamental ideas of Marx and Engels, right from the period of their publication and dissemination, and of the working class's understanding of its historic role in the elimination of social systems based on exploitation and oppression and in the building of a socialist society. Stressing the firm placement of the workers' movement in Romania and its political party on the principles of scientific socialism, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu noted: "Our revolutionary movement has always based its activities on the lessons of Marx and Engels. Precisely because of this fact both the revolutionary movement of the past and, more significantly, the Romanian Communist Party were able and succeeded in leading the social and national struggles in our country, and they lead to victory the great battles carried out by the working class, the other revolutionary forces and all our people in order to overthrow the bourgeois-landowner oppression and to build socialism."

Throughout the years, socialist, democratic and progressive Romanian journalism has dedicated numerous articles to the life and activities of Karl Marx. Right from 1883, the year of his death, the socialist journal DACIA VIITOARE wrote: "If posterity remembers a single man, it will be Karl Marx, who contributed so much to the elaboration of the ideas that freed mankind. Recognition of this truth is the greatest tribute that we can pay to the memory of this great thinker." DACIA VIITOARE also noted that "Marx was not just a thinker, but also a fighter. He was the founder of the International Association of Workers, whose sublime vision was: the emancipation of workers will be carried out by themselves."

On 18 March 1883, the newspaper APARATORUL notified its readers of Karl Marx's death, noting: "One of the most original thinkers of the century - Karl Marx, the celebrated socialist - has died. His death has everywhere produced a great deal of emotion and the greatest newspapers have dedicated lead stories to him in which all are unanimous in recognizing the genius of his ideas and the profound nature of his great man's beliefs... He is the most eminent of the contemporary socialists and one of the deepest thinking economists of our time." Showing Marx's great merits "as the discoverer of the laws of economic evolution and especially the laws that exist in the origins of capitalism and the mandatory transformations of the means of production," the same newspaper concluded that "Marx will remain one of the most eminent men of the 19th century."

On this occasion another Romanian publication, NATIUNEA, presented two articles on Marx the man and the theoretician, recognizing him as "the most important socialist writer in our times," and concluded: "He who will want to further the study of the history of the continent" in the second half of the 19th century will have to read Marx's works "so as to understand the political and social ideas of millions of people in Europe."

Numerous other articles were also published in the following years in the workers press in our country under the signatures of the most significant representatives of the revolutionary movement. These articles pointed out both the political and scientific significance of the great works left to the proletariat everywhere by Karl Marx and his revolutionary personality and activities.

Among the many concerns of the revolutionary thinker Karl Marx, those in the field of history had a place of special significance and among these were the analyses made on the history of the Romanian people that were put forth on the basis of solid information, a profound knowledge of realities and, especially, demonstrated sympathy and devotion to the Romanian people and its uneasy and glorious history.

In the last century, when the revolutionary ideas of scientific socialism were being expressed in the world, the Romanian people were in a full expression of the awareness of national-state continuity and the unity of origin and culture of all the inhabitants of the three principalities, mobilizing their energies, opposing through their struggles the gross interference of the great surrounding empires in their affairs, and weaving their fate as they wanted, against the desires of these others, so as to be united in a fully independent national state.

Carefully following this vigorous statement, Karl Marx expressed a special interest in the Romanian people and supported the struggle for liberation and full national independence, seeing in this struggle an important component of the European revolutionary movement for the emancipation of oppressed peoples.

The works published by Marx and Engels - studies, articles, notes and commentaries, as well as a series of manuscripts left behind by these two titans of revolutionary thought - deal with, many times in a detailed manner, the carrying out of

multiple processes in Southeastern Europe, including on the territory of Romania, which, due to its geographic position and wealth, constituted the target for attacks and attempts to subjugate it on the part of many empires.

In order to author the studies and articles dealing with the Romanian problem, Karl Marx brought together a vast amount of documentary materials. He made efforts to have documentation that was also written in Romanian. "I saw this at once," wrote Marx's friend, the Russian historian M. Kovalevski, "reading the newspaper ROMANUL, and I had the opportunity to convince myself that he could deal with the Romanian language very well."

In his works, Karl Marx revealed the age of the Romanian people and its historical unity and continuity in the territory that it had occupied over the millenia, as well as its heroic struggle to bring about certain fundamental desires, first of all the creation of the fully independent and unified national state. Alongside Friedrich Engels, he pointed out that the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic region was inhabited from ancient times by the Romanian people. "The Vlachs, or the Daco-Romans (...)," he wrote, "are a people... of the Orthodox religion and who speak a language of Latin origin, that is in many regards similar to Italian."

There are numerous references to the history of the Romanian Middle Ages. There is the note in Marx's manuscripts regarding the heroism of the Romanians led by the great voivode Stefan the Great in the battle at Vaslui to defend against the invading Ottomans. "On 17 January 1475," Marx wrote, "there was the battle of Rahova (Vaslui - ed.) near the Birlad River. The Moldavian army, composed of 40,000 Moldavian peasants who were poorly armed and taken to the scene away from their ploughs," led by Stefan the Great won a shining victory at a moment when the military forces of the Ottoman Empire, of more than 100,000 men, were feared by the entire world and considered invincible.

In researching the legal relationships of Muntenia and Moldavia with the Ottoman Porte, as expressed in the treaties concluded between the two parties, Marx wrote: "The Danubian principalities are two sovereign states under the suzerainty of the Porte, to whom they pay a tribute, on the condition, however, that the Porte defend them from all external enemies, no matter who they may be, and that the Porte not interfere in any way in their internal affairs."

In his writings, Marx also pointed out the liberating goals of the revolution led by Horea, Closca and Crisan and the personality of Horea who pursued "the liberation of his people," becoming "the symbol of the rebirth of Dacia." Referring to the revolutionary events of 1821, Karl Marx evaluated them as "a peasants revolution." He wrote: "Vladimirescu was a Romanian patriot... He also called to arms the peasants in the Oltenian Mountains; they came from the mountains together to Craiova, he gathered the people and let them know his plans for liberation."

Understanding the entire text of the 1831 Organic Regulations instituted under the protectorate of Russia and evaluating them as being "work rules for forced labor," Marx used them in his work "Das Kapital" in order to explain the

economic relationships between peasants and landowners. Analyzing the agrarian system in the Principalities, Marx illustrated the problem of the "pursuit of surplus labor" of the landowners and equally as well the problem of the English bourgeois factory owner.

The 1848 Romanian Revolution was saluted by Karl Marx with enthusiastic words: "The Vlachs overthrew the old government and are temporarily putting in its place a new one. They want to change the entire old system." Marx made ample comments and profound evaluations regarding the carrying out of revolutionary events in Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania. K. Marx and F. Engels wrote: "With regards to the Vlachs in Transylvania, we heard much talk during the war in Hungary." These people were "under the oppression of the feudal system of the great Hungarian feudal landowners who, in accordance with the Austrian system, were also transformed into instruments of governmental robbery."

In his writings about the Romanians, Marx noted: "In 1848, there was a Romanian revolt in Transylvania against the Hungarians. This revolt was preceded by a peaceful struggle." Making an appeal to history, he refers to the arrival of the Hungarians from Asia who, in Transylvania, under the leadership of Tuhutum "encountered the army of the Romanians." Then he notes the settlement of the Szecklers who, in settling in these places, occupied "a corner of old Dacia." Marx also states that Transylvania was an autonomous state after the defeat of Hungary at Mohaci in 1526, concluding that "the Hungarians incorrectly considered Transylvania as an integral part of Hungary."

Karl Marx also revealed the historical injustice done to the Romanian people over the ages by the Hungarian nobility in Transylvania, who considered the Romanian people to be "a tolerated nation on its own land." "They were called the 'vagabond people' although they accounted for two-thirds of the population, while the Hungarians, Saxons, Szecklers, Greeks and Armenians accounted for only the other one-third." Marx and Engels correctly noted that this attitude of lack of consideration for the Romanian people produced among the Romanians, as well as among the other nations oppressed by the Habsburg Empire, a lively indignation which expressed itself in open warfare against the oppressors.

Pointing out the power of this resistance and the legitimate rights of our people, then totally nearly 11 million people, Marx in his article "The Danubian Principalities" supported the right of the Romanian people to have a unified and independent state. In his works, he unmasked the policies of the great European powers, which did not support the aspirations of the Romanian people or their struggle for unity, sovereignty, independence and social progress. Marx gave even more value to the Romanian people's defeat of the great powers' plans when, on 24 January 1859, they achieved the Unification of Moldavia and Muntenia, a unification evaluated by him as a crucial event for the destiny of the Romanian people. Marx wrote: "The unification and independence of the Romanian nation were ratified through the election of Colonel Cuza as the ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia."

After the 1867 creation of the dual Austro-Hungary monarchy, an oppressor of peoples, in the summary by M. Bakunin in 1874-1875, "The State and Anarchy," regarding Marx's works, he notes that Marx had said in regards to the revolutionary events in the dual monarchy: "In Hungary, the majority of the population under the Hungarians do not sympathize with them, and they support this regime against their own will, and as a result there is a constant struggle. The Hungarians are afraid of a revolt by the Romanians and the Slavs; this is the source of the secret alliance with Bismarck..."

The analyses made by Karl Marx regarding the history of the Romanian people and its struggle for unity and national independence and social freedom, as published in the widely-circulated newspapers and magazines throughout the world, gave a broad international echo to the Romanian cause. They contributed to a better understanding of the profound meanings of the activities of the Romanian patriots who emigrated after the 1848 revolution, an activity that was combined with the national struggle within the country that was also designed to solidify the attention of the democratic circles and European governments regarding the justness of Romanian aspirations.

8724

CSO: 2700/178

ROLE OF CLASS, NATIONAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 24, 25 Dec 82 pp 23-26

[Article by Dr Vasile Secares: "The Contradictions of International Life in the Current Stage"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Text/ We are living in a world undergoing profound and extensive change, including on a world level, on the plane of the structure of the relations between states. The understanding of the causes of this, of the social and political forces involved and of the course of historical evolution is conditioned by, among other things, the proper characterization of the contradictions that are manifesting themselves today in international life.

It proves necessary, in particular, to approach them in a close connection with the more and more obvious growth of the complexity of the situation, with the aggravation and complication of world relations. As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in the report presented at the national party conference, "We are going through a very unsettled era, with mankind being staggered by economic, political and military quakes, storms and hurricanes of great proportions, which are putting the peoples to difficult trials, are causing them great harm and suffering."

Clearly, the view formulated by our party and its secretary general with regard to the current crisis of the international system and the contradictions that are characteristic of it creates, in this regard too, a fertile framework for an innovative analysis lacking any dogmatic complex. The importance of this creative approach seems clear if we also consider the fact that the subject in question frequently occasions--within the framework of political judgments and of specialized studies, even the ones that claim descent from a Marxist outlook--erroneous or simplistic explanations, theses that do not stand up under a comparison with reality.

As we know, in general, at present, the economic, political, military and ideological arrangements characteristic of the existing international system appeared after World War II, in connection with its direct consequences and the processes that followed it in the postwar period. Presenting things very briefly, we would say

that, contradictorily, the basic traits of world political life determined on such a basis have been marked by the maintenance and aggravation of the division of the world into rich countries and poor countries, of the relations of inequality, domination and exploitation, thus of the unfair interdependencies between nations and states, by the placement of the relationships of power (especially the political and military ones) in a bipolar framework and by the division of the world into spheres of influence, by the centralization of the decisionmaking, of the participation in solving international problems, but also, at the same time, by the affirmation of a bigger and bigger number of states, by the diversification of the component elements of the system--along with the appearance of the socialist countries, of the countries that gained their independence under the conditions of the anticolonial struggle--by the growth of the role of the small and middle-sized countries in international life.

Under the impact of the revolutionary, social and national transformations, of the scientific and technical revolution, of the changes produced in the balance of power in the world, the old international system has entered, at present, a profound crisis. We are the witnesses to the changes, often the upheavals in the economic structures created by imperialism; to the disintegration of the bipolar political and security framework and the appearance of new centers of power; to the derangement of the mechanisms for solving world problems, based on the role of the great powers and on the recourse to force. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the old international order has ceased to correspond any longer to the stage attained in the development of society, that its possibilities have been exhausted. With good reason, in the party's program it is judged that our era is "the era of the elimination of imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist domination, of the placement of the relations between states and nations on new principles, ones of equality and respect for national independence and sovereignty." The evolutions in recent times demonstrate clearly that, at present, we are in a period of restructuring of international social, economic, political and military relationships, of rearrangement of the balance of power, of achievement of a new world equilibrium between different states and groups of states, as a support for a new order in the world, which would replace the old order based on inequality and imperialist and colonialist oppression.

In the current stage, world political relationships are thus marked by a confrontation in connection with the nature and character of the international order, by the confrontation between two diametrically opposed trends. As it says in the report presented at the national party conference, there is manifesting itself, "on the one hand, the imperialist policy--of force and dictation, of interference in the affairs of other states, of maintenance and division of the spheres of influence, of armament, which is leading to the growth of the danger of wars, including a world war. On the other hand, there is developing strongly the trend toward the elimination of the imperialist, colonialist policy, of the spheres of influence, of interference in internal affairs, the trend of establishing new relations between states, based on equality, on respect for independence and sovereignty, on noninterference in internal affairs, the trend of eliminating the policy of force and dictation, of securing each people's right to free, independent development, as it wants, without any outside interference." The complexity of the differentiations, of the oppositions, of

the clashes and, correlatively, of the conjunctions of interests, of the approaches or of the groupings in the context of which the two trends are asserting themselves appears more than evident. The current evolution materializes the manifestation of a variety of contradictions in the world arena.

Class and National Determinations

As is known, the Marxist studies utilized for a long time a model of the contradictions and, in general, of the political relationships between states that presupposed their reduction to antagonisms and to relations with a class character. The analysis thus used a single variable, which covered only the class factors, simplifying unjustifiably the genesis of world politics and, on the other hand, ignoring its specific character. As a consequence, for a long time, it was felt, for example, that the elimination of the contradictions between classes must entail, through this very fact, the disappearance of the antagonisms and the conflicts between nations and states. Such a perspective led, moreover, to the improper or erroneous characterization of a whole series of phenomena and processes of the greatest significance in the modern era.

The first remark that should be made in this context concerns the very significance of the "class factors" for the analysis of the contradictions that are manifesting themselves today in the world. Concretely, we have in mind the specificity of the manifestation of the class interests, relationships and struggle in the world arena. If we put ourselves on the plane of the structural determinations of this level, international relations are, first and foremost, relations between nations and states. The national state is the basic unit of international life, and its manifestations are essential for determining the characteristics of this perimeter of social, economic, political, military and other relationships.

Of course, we will not overlook the class character of the actions of the states "on the outside," of the relations that are established between them. The contradictions in international life will reflect, too, the distribution and influence of the class forces, as is happening even now. Nevertheless, especially in the world arena, the national state is far from being, purely and simply, an "alias" for "class" (even if we are referring to ruling classes in a state). It expresses a distinct reality, whose foundation does not come down to class data but presupposes complex elements of a social, economic, political, cultural and psychological nature and, in particular, connected with the manifestation of the nation as a specific form of human community.

The conclusion that we could draw refers, on the one hand, to the fact that the class factors, the class relations, act, in essence, in a mediate way, in international life, by means of the activity of the states and the relations between nations and states. Inevitably, the contradictions with a class character manifested at the level of world political life will not be identical to those between classes within a society (nation). On the other hand, it seems, we believe, clear that class struggles and national struggles are inseparable. In particular, as we will have the occasion to make evident later, it is necessary for the dialectics of the class struggle on an international level to be analyzed in a direct connection with the mechanisms and with the consequences of the unequal development of the nations and states.

Another remark, resulting directly from the above considerations, refers to the fact that world political life cannot be understood properly and often cannot be understood at all if we resort exclusively to the class factors, whose importance cannot be, of course, underestimated. The manifestation of the nations, of the national states, as basic units of international life has, in my opinion, two extremely important consequences in the perspective of our analysis. On the one hand, it is a question of the fact that, although foreign policies exhibit, as I said, real and obvious class connotations, they have class interests as a starting point, as they are defined by the ends that the state power seeks to promote on the outside, and the formulation and materialization of these interests and ends are achieved within the framework of a complex determination, of the action of various factors, expressing the totality of the conditions for the existence and independent development of the nations in question, of the problems which this development presupposes or with which it is confronted in a certain stage, the aggregate of the specific traits of the national framework, of the attributes of a social, economic, political, military, ideological and cultural nature arising in the process of the historical evolution of the state.

In consequence, the contradictions of international life will also develop--and must be, I believe, analyzed--in connection with the differences, opposition and even antagonisms specific to the problems outlined by the affirmation of the values and essential determinations of the nation and its state: the constitution, maintenance and consolidation of the national state; the real and multilateral providing of its independence and sovereignty; the materialization of its own interests and objectives of economic and political development; and the manifestation of its capacity to adopt a certain domestic and foreign policy, to participate in international interactions and to influence the environment in which it acts. It is not hard to see, for example, that the modern social and political transformations are superimposed over movements with a strong national imprint and, as a result, all the aspects regarding the self-determination of the nations are intensely politicized, acquiring a major weight in defining the contradictions of our world. Just as it seems clear that a number of contradictions generated by certain territorial or national realities, by the economic interests resulting from the differentiated development of the states or by certain goals associated with the evolution on the plane of the power of the national state often go beyond class "boundaries."

On the other hand, it is easy to see that the structural traits of the relations between nations and states create a broad base for the appearance of "contradictory aspects and trends." Obviously, the contradictions that develop in the context of the distribution of wealth and power in the world--thus, basic contradictions for international life--cannot be reduced to relations, to contradictions with a class character. Moreover, as the realities show, in this framework there can appear strong contradictions between states belonging to the same social system. Consequently, their description requires the taking into consideration of key variables regarding the traits of the current international structure in the field of the unfair distribution of wealth on a world level, of the effects of a certain division of labor in the world, of the gaps and asymmetrical relations between the rich countries and the poor ones and in the field of the unfair and hierarchical "distribution" of the positions of power, of the political, military, strategic and economic interests, attributes and resources.

One specification, also necessary in my opinion, would be that by the complex determination of the contradictions existing on a world level we must understand not only

the involvement of many variables but also the interference and mixing of the respective factors. In other words, /in international life there appear not pure contradictions (of class, with a national character, of power and so on), but contradictions with a mixed basis/. In their appearance and development there arise, in various proportions, a number of factors with a class character, factors connected with the manifestation of the essential determinations of the nation, with the positions and relations defined on the plane of development, with the relationships of power characteristic of the world order. In the context of the differences, inequalities and, in general, relations existing today in the world, the integrated but asymmetrical influence of these variables will outline many chains of opposition, of contradictory coexistence, with a greater or lesser degree of coherence and individuality. At the same time, the intersection and interweaving of the respective types of contradictions are achieved on the same basis.

The Complexity and Variety of the Contradictions of the Modern World

Consequently, it seems clear that the dynamics of international life do not involve a single category of contradictions and, correlatively, of convergences: the aspects and trends, the forces that are opposed or are combined are diverse, and their conflicts and alignments are characterized by complexity and variety. Moreover, the "front" lines and "trenches" of these confrontations, far from following distinct and/or parallel routes, intersect, interpenetrate in an obvious manner.

It is necessary for us to emphasize, in this regard, the particular importance of the antidogmatic, profoundly creative perspective introduced by the Romanian Communist Party and its secretary general, in studying the contradictions of international life, the major significance of the theoretical results obtained on this plane. Back in the '70's, in the analyses of the secretary general of the party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the picture of the current confrontations appeared in a completely new light: besides the contradictions with a class character, there were mentioned the contradictions between the imperialist countries and the subjugated countries, between imperialism and the developing countries, and other contradictions between various states and groups of states. In his speech at the expanded plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1982, the secretary general of the party formulated a thesis whose theoretical significance goes without saying. We have in mind the judgment that the history of mankind is the history of class struggles and, at the same time, the history of the struggles for protecting one's own being or for national liberation and independent development and against foreign domination. This remark speaks, I believe, clearly about the determination of world political relationships as a dialectical interaction of the contradictions generated by the reciprocal positions and interests of the nations and states.

The report presented by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu at the national party conference develops further and substantiates in detail, in the light of the changes, evolutions and trends that are asserting themselves on a world level, the judgments with regard to the nature, diversity and complexity of the contradictions of modern international life, formulating, on this basis, political conclusions of the greatest topicality and importance. We must stress, in particular, the noting of the current process of multiplication of the contradictions between different states and groups of states and, in addition, of the "rearrangement" that is occurring in regard to their relative importance.

Putting ourselves in such a theoretical framework, we can say that modern international life is characterized by the existence of many and varied contradictions. It is a question, above all, of structural or constituent contradictions that define the basic, essential relationships for the dynamics of international life in our era: the contradiction between capitalism; the contradiction between the developed countries and the developing ones, between the rich countries and the poor countries; the contradiction created by the asymmetrical and hierarchical power structure, by the relations of domination and dependency. Besides them and in a close connection with them, there are what we could call associated or derived contradictions: between the imperialist states, between the great powers engaged in hegemonistic, expansionistic policies; between the capitalist countries; between the rich, developed countries; between the socialist states; between the developing countries; between various other states, on a bilateral or regional plane, in connection with various factors (national, economic, political, military, demographic, ideological, cultural and so on).

/The contradiction between capitalism and socialism/--a basic contradiction of the modern world--expresses in essentially class terms the dynamics of international life. It began to manifest itself as a constituent relationship of world politics along with the appearance of the socialist countries, a time that marked the end of the coincidence of the international system with the capitalist world system and the beginning of the latter's crisis. Its basic character results from the fact that, in the long term, the evolution of the relation implies essential transformations in the world social and economic structure, more precisely, the replacement of the bourgeois mode of production, as a basis of the arrangements existing on an international level. Without going into a wider analysis of this contradiction, we nevertheless consider it necessary to point out a few aspects.

In particular, the complexity of the contradictory relationships implied by the restriction of the area of domination of capitalism and by the struggle for socialism on a world level must be pointed out. On the one hand, it is a question of the fact that the elimination of the bourgeois mode of production is defined as a process in which, at the same time, different forces--both as to origin and orientation and as to position in relation to state power--are involved and which occurs in different ways and forms. As a result, /the opposition between the countries following the path of socialism and the capitalist countries constitutes only a component of the contradiction between capitalism and socialism/, which, of course, could not be reduced to just the above-mentioned opposition.

Consequently, we will conclude that, in regard to the determination of the contradiction between capitalism and socialism, it is necessary for us to reject the simplistic, unilateral image of a rigid polarization of the world. Naturally, the struggle for socialism is generating a serious confrontation on a world level; the social, economic and political transformations implied by the construction of the new order in different countries has raised and is raising for discussion, too, the international arrangements generated by capitalism, a fact that has involved and involves, often, correlated reactions and counterreactions. Nevertheless, the capitalism-socialism contradiction does not mean a division of the world into "two camps" and cannot be described properly in terms of the so-called "East-West conflict." It is true, this restrictive view--in connection both with the process of the transition to socialism and with that referring to the foreign relations that this process occasions--still has a wide prevalence and exhibits a serious

persistence on the plane of the ideological confrontations. However, the "East-West" antagonism and polarization, arising in international politics in the period right after the war, were due not to the struggle for socialism but to certain specific conditions created by the bipolar confrontation on a political, military and ideological plane, in terms of power. The contradiction developed in this framework--one that entailed the formation of the military blocs and the accentuation of the policy of force, the division of the world into spheres of influence and so on--has often come, as more remote or more recent episodes demonstrate, to mystify, to exacerbate, to distort, to subordinate or to sacrifice interests and objectives of the economic, social and political development in various countries (in this context, of the class struggle); the negative action on the relationships between states, especially by affecting basic principles of them--independence and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, abstention from force--has been and is no less important.

The harmfulness of such an approach is obvious. It denies the freedom to choose one's own ways of development, including one's own path to socialism, hindering the consideration of domestic problems as problems that must be solved by each people. This position leads to the judging of the evolutions that take place in one country or another and of the events in the international arena only in terms of the bipolar confrontation. But, as the secretary general of the party pointed out in the report presented at the national conference, "Socialism cannot be exported, cannot and must not be imposed from outside, it will be achieved only by the progressive social forces in each country and must express the will of each people. At the same time, it is necessary to reject firmly any exportation of counterrevolution, of outside support for the reactionary forces in the struggle against their own peoples. Each nation must determine freely its path of social and national development, must forge the order that it wants, without any outside interference."

The perspective of the confrontation between "the two camps" also leads to the reduction of the capitalism-socialism contradiction to a military expression, it being judged that the relationships on the plane of armed force are essential for its evolution, and to the understanding of its occurrence in the form of a chain of confrontations on the "border" between the systems (with "local" wars, with "enveloping" operations and so on). This view is becoming more and more dangerous under the conditions of the levels attained by the development of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.

It is clear that the realities of the socialism-capitalism contradiction resist a treatment on the basis of bloc logic, in the light of the interests of distributing or redistributing the zones of domination, of balancing or rearranging the relationships on a military and strategic plane. Nothing will be able to stop the passage of more and more peoples, in one form or another, in accordance with the conditions in each country, to the socialist path of development. At the same time, we must state that the discerning and respecting of the diversity of the social, economic and political evolutions in the world create directly the possibility of abandoning the policy of force and of developing strategies of multilateral cooperation between states for a constructive approach to the problems of mankind. Today, there is a good understanding with regard to the necessity of peaceful coexistence between the countries with different social orders.

As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated in the report presented at the national party conference, "The socialist trends and choices of more and more peoples constitute a

basic characteristic of the modern era.... This variety of socialist forms and choices is opening up new prospects for the struggle of the peoples for a free, independent, righter and better life."

Along with the socialism-capitalism contradiction, a new contradiction has developed in the world--/the contradiction between the developed countries and the developing countries, between the rich countries and the poor countries/, a creation with time of the unequal, disproportionate development of the world system as a result of the imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist policy. The fact that all the attempts thus far to come to certain understandings with regard to the elimination of underdevelopment and the achievement of the new international economic order have not led to the expected results--on the contrary, in this period, the gaps between the rich and the poor have widened--is causing this contradiction to acquire a stronger and stronger form. As is pointed out in the report presented at the national party conference, due to its scope and character, it is becoming "the most important contradiction of the modern era."

The defining of the specificity of this contradiction entails the stressing of the fact that it does not boil down, purely and simply, to certain differences, more or less important--which were created accidentally by historical evolution and/or which can be the object of relatively varied classifications--on the plane of economic development. It involves states and groups of states that occupy different positions in the economic and political structure of the international system and to which different parts of the world's wealth go. It must be said that this contradiction refers to groups of states engaged in unequal, asymmetrical relationships of exploitation (some being developed at the expense of others), to countries of which some want to preserve their privileges and others to achieve "economic decolonization," to eliminate poverty, the different forms of dependency, to assert their rights. In a well-founded way, therefore, our party regards the manifestation of the contradiction between the rich countries and the poor countries as a struggle between the exploited and the exploiters on a world level. Moreover, it is significant that the ideological and political reactions to the desires of the states in the Third World become negative when they formulate explicitly the goal of a substantial transformation--in the sense of redistribution--in the field of economic (and political) power, of the establishment of a new world order.

A contradiction with a structural character, the contradiction between the developed countries and the developing countries combines in its occurrence various elements, connected with the differences of an economic, political, military, ideological and cultural nature between states, acquiring a truly global significance for the evolution of today's world. Of course, the essential role goes, as I stated, to the different positions in the international economic system, ones that can be defined in terms of the "center" (dominant)--"periphery" (exploited) opposition. Nevertheless, we will note, in this framework, two aspects. On the one hand, we have in mind the fact that this confrontation too must not be understood as entailing a simple, strictly outlined polarization of international life. As is known, an absolutely identical situation for all the developing countries does not exist: some, for instance, have certain special relations with the developed countries; in addition, in their turn, a number of so-called "regional" powers are asserting their specific interests. All these things complicate greatly the relationships that define the above-mentioned contradiction, sometimes generating obstacles in the way of the solidarity of the developing states in the struggle for their emancipation.

On the other hand, it seems clear that relations marked by the consequences of differential development and of asymmetrical insertion into the international division of labor are manifesting themselves, to one degree or another, between or within all categories of states, and not only in connection with the so-called "North-South" axis: also within the "central" capitalist area, also in the relationships between the capitalist states and the socialist ones, also among the socialist countries and so on. The resolution of the analyzed contradiction presupposes, in other words, the restructuring of the aggregate of the relations between states, marked by gaps in development, entails a true revolution in the social, economic and political fabric of the world, under the sign of forging a new international economic order, based on new principles, ones of equality and fairness, of reciprocal advantage. And the crisis that is assuming great proportions today in the world indicates directly the urgency of such a course.

There is a close connection between the resolution of the capitalism-socialism contradiction and that of the contradiction between the rich countries and the poor ones. However, we must emphasize that the respective connection cannot be characterized properly in terms of an "East-West-South" triangle, in other words, in terms of the confrontation, in the developing world, of two political, military, economic groups with a different class nature. In addition, it is not a question of the conditioning of the changes in the direction of the new international economic order by the evolution toward socialism in the Third World countries. In their concrete manifestation, the capitalism-socialism contradiction and the developed states-developing states contradiction intersect dialectically. In this regard, the struggle for national liberation, for eliminating the economic and political dependency on imperialism, is a decisive step on the path of historical changes in the world, toward socialism.

/The contradiction between different states and groups of states/--another important contradiction of international life--/appearing in the context of and in connection with the power structure of the world system/, has as premises, among other things: the major differences on the plane of resources and of attributes--in particular, political and military ones, but also economic ones; the concentration and centralization of the decisionmaking on world problems; the unfair, hierarchical relations established between nations and states; the imperialistic, hegemonistic practices of resorting to force, of creating, maintaining and redividing the spheres of influence; the impossibility of fully asserting, in this framework, the values that define the position or manifestation of the nation, of the national state in the world.

We regard this contradiction--generated by the relationships of differentiation and opposition between the great powers and the small and middle-sized states, between the states following the path of an imperialist policy and the countries becoming a target of the respective policy, integrated into relations of dependency or contained in certain spheres of influence and so on--as one of the structural, constituent contradictions of international life. Of course, it is not possible to ignore the fact that the functioning of the power structure--and, in this context, the manifestation and consequences of the gaps and of the political and military relationships--is not foreign to the action of the class factors. Consequently, it is natural to take into consideration the differences in social order between the great powers. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the above-mentioned aspect must lead us not to the conclusion of the nonexistence of the contradiction in question but to the

understanding of its specific intersection with the contradictions in class terms. Moreover, it is necessary, I believe, for us to take into account that it is also interconditioned with the associated, derived contradiction that is manifesting itself between the imperialist states, in general between the great powers (and, moreover, with other contradictions).

Especially in the present stage, the contradiction created by the current distribution of power, by the current relationships of force on a world level, is acquiring a critical significance for the evolution of interstate relations. It seems clear that one essential desire of the present is that of putting an end to the policy of great power, of hegemony and of interference in any form in the internal affairs of the small and middle-sized countries, to the policy of the zones of influence and interests. A few elements merit special attention. First, we have in mind the clearer and clearer affirmation of the struggle of the small and middle-sized countries, of the nonaligned countries, of the developing countries for the restructuring of the equilibrium existing in the world, for the elimination of the relationships of inequality, of domination, for the democratization of international relations. Second, it is a question of the diversification of the centers of power, of the fact that new states and groups of states are claiming a more important role in world politics. Third, a broad confrontation has developed in connection with the desire to stop the arms race and turn to disarmament, with more and more states understanding the importance of destroying the military hardware of the old international political order. Fourth, it is necessary to mention the violent counterreaction of great powers, of Western states--which refuse to admit that they have lost the capacity to control events absolutely--for blocking the course toward change, for freezing and strengthening the current distribution of power in the world, the spheres of influence. We believe that all these elements--which we encounter in a very precise form in the report presented by the secretary general of the party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, at the national conference and in the speech at the expanded plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1982--identify some of the main manifestations and dimensions of the contradiction to which we are referring.

The Imperative of Peaceful Cooperation Between All Peoples and Nations of the World

The essential data of the constituent contradictions of international life and the specific elements referring to their interference outline directly and concretize the content of the broad confrontation that is occurring today in the world between the two diametrically opposed trends.

In this framework, we can note the current trend toward forming, in the context of the manifestation of the basic contradictions described, a global structure--political, military and economic--meant to protect and to consolidate the old arrangements and privileges, to stabilize the old international order in the interest of the "center," of those who, due to their resources and power, feel that they have a "special role" in the world. Clearly, this imperial(ist) "superstructure" is based on the correlation of the attributes and of the actions of power and determines its functioning in terms of force, in its various aspects. To this trend there is opposed the stronger and stronger manifestation of the will of the peoples of the world to secure the affirmation of a new policy, one of equality and fairness, of respect for national independence and sovereignty, of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, to secure the establishment--on the basis of these principles--of a new balance of power, a new world equilibrium between different states and groups of states.

We are in a period of expansion and deepening of the crisis of the world system, of aggravation of the confrontations, of accentuation of the old contradictions and of appearance of new economic and social contradictions. This is generating serious uncertainties about the prospects of stability, security and peace in the world. The extremely serious tension created in the world has lead to the growth of the dangers of the outbreak of new military conflicts, including a world war. Under these conditions, the way in which the contradictions of international life evolve--more precisely, in which the different social and political forces act in the context of the relations between them--is of capital importance. In the view of socialist Romania and Chairman Nicolae Ceausescu, an absolute priority of the current stage--essential for rationally approaching the problems that confront all mankind--must be given to eliminating force and the threat of force, to braking the evolution toward war. In the current international situation, regardless of the form in which it appears, the recourse to force directly aggravates the instability, tends to push the world not toward the resolution of the contradictions but toward disaster. This is why it is necessary, as the secretary general of the party stated, "to abandon the appeal to arms, to turn to negotiations for solving all problems between states."

Our country has expressed its conviction that the states and the peoples of the world have the capacity to stop the deterioration of the international climate, the accentuation of the confrontation. In fact, it must be said that, in the modern era, under the conditions of the accentuation of the interdependencies on a world level, of the expansion of the spectrum of the common interests with a global character, the ground for imposing a new perspective with regard to the contradictions of international life has become firmer and firmer. In addition, if we consider the changes that are produced, inevitably, in the balance of power in the world, there are sufficient grounds for speaking about the real possibility of transforming the constructive approach, in the spirit of peaceful cooperation, to any disputes between states into a pivot of the struggle for progressive, democratic changes in international relations.

Of course, as our party points out, only the elimination of the old arrangements and the creation of a new international economic and political order can constitute the framework for properly resolving the current contradictions. The effective placement of the relations between all states on the basis of the recognized principles of international law would have, in this context, a decisive significance. "All states, and especially the great powers," it says in the report presented at the national conference, "must assume their solemn obligation to follow in international relations and to observe the principles of fully equal rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and reciprocal advantage. Events and life demonstrate strongly that only on the basis of these principles is it possible to solve the complex problems of world life." This process cannot be separated from the efforts directed toward eliminating the state of underdevelopment, toward establishing fair economic relationships. At the same time, it is necessary to note its direct, organic connection with stopping the arms race and turning to disarmament, particularly to nuclear disarmament. As our party has pointed out repeatedly, the future belongs to a righter and better world, to social and national equality, to respect for each people's right to free, independent development.

'HISTORICAL LIMITS' OF DICTATORSHIP OF PROLETARIAT

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[Article by Radu Florian: "The Historical Limits of a Concept: the Dictatorship of the Proletariat--a Few Theoretical Data"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] In the history of Marxist thought and of the working-class movement, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat is certainly the ground for one of the most bitter conflicts registered in their evolution. Under the conditions of the crisis through which the international socialist movement passed during the imperialist World War I, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was the chief line of separation in the constitution of the two political currents of the working class in our century: communist and social democratic.

For half a century, the first of these two currents unanimously regarded acceptance of the above-mentioned thesis as an obligatory criterion of the revolutionary policy of the working class. Total or partial rejection of the thesis was regarded as a symptom of the reformist policy, conciliatory toward the bourgeoisie, toward perseverance of the capitalist society. The attitude was based on Lenin's categorical assertion that only recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat means placement within the framework of Marxism.

In the last decade, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat again became the object of an extensive discussion, there appearing the tendency to restrict its impact in Marxist political thought as a whole. One of the arguments frequently invoked in this regard is that the concept of a dictatorship of the proletariat is associated with the distorting, antidemocratic practices of Stalinism. Naturally, such an association must be borne in mind as significant in the investigation of the matter, but this must be centered on the analysis of the idea's initial components and later interpretations, on their confrontation with the processes of social practice.

The idea of the emergence through revolution of a socialist state as a dictatorship of the proletariat was unquestionably worked out by Marx and Engels. In an indirect form, it appears back in "The Communist Manifesto," in the formulation according to which the socialist state is the proletariat organized as a ruling class. The idea is in keeping with Marx's and Engels' view of the state as an organized power of one class for dominating others.

In a direct form, the thesis is encountered, through the mention of the term "/dictatorship/," in Marx's work "The Class Struggles in France," in which it is stated that "the /constitutional republic/ is the dictatorship of the exploiters..., the /Red, social democratic/ republic is the dictatorship of its allies"¹ (that is, of the proletariat--our note). In an equally explicit way, it is mentioned in Marx's well-known letter to Weidemeyer, with its terms often quoted later: "...the class struggle leads necessarily to the /dictatorship of the proletariat/,...this dictatorship itself forms only the transition to /the abolition of all classes and to a classless society/."² Just as it reappears in "The Critique of the Gotha Program" and in Engels' text about the draft program of the German Social Democratic Party: "One thing is certain..., our party and the working class can establish their domination only in the form of the democratic republic. This is exactly the specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat...."³

In order to grasp the meaning of the idea, we mention the demonstration made by the creators of Marxism that any state is an instrument for domination by the ruling class over the subordinate classes. The term "dictatorship" had the meaning of political domination, or, in other words, of imposition of the will of the ruling class on the dominated social groups. It is hard to dispute that this term grasps a profound mechanism of the functioning of the state as a nucleus of the political power of a class.

The exegesis of the political thought of Marx and Engels--including that undertaken by Lenin--being directed against those who, like E. Bernstein, denied the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a means of exercising the authority of the anticapitalist forces, acquired a unilateral character, neglecting essential aspects of the thesis with which we are dealing. Thus, the fact went unobserved that the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" was used initially in a strict antithesis with the term "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" as an embodiment of the capitalist state, as follows clearly from the lines quoted from "The Class Struggles in France." There is a distinct difference between the meaning imparted to the expression "dictatorship" that designates the capitalist state and the one that refers to the socialist state: the first brings out the antidemocratic character of the bourgeoisie's domination over the subordinate social groups; the second indicated the necessity of attaining the revolution's political goal, the defeat of the bourgeoisie. In Marx and Engels, the expression "/dictatorship of the proletariat/" does not have any undemocratic connotation or one of partial restriction of democracy.

The most serious limit of the exegesis made in the past with regard to the idea's original sources consisted of the omission of its constant connection with the exigencies and values of representative democracy. Even in "The Communist Manifesto," the socialist state is identified with the stage of the acquisition of democracy, which, in Marx's and Engels' view, meant, without any ambiguity, the acquisition, protection and respecting of the rights and liberties of the citizens, typical of a representative democracy. Back in "The German Ideology," they specified in this regard: "For the workers the importance of civil rights--that is, the rights of /active/ citizens of the state--is so great that where they possess such rights..., they 'make the most' of them, and where they are deprived of civil rights, they want to acquire them."⁴

For Marx, it was wholly natural for the Parisian proletariat of 1848 to see in the democratic republican institutions instruments for the transformation of the

capitalist society. Marx's assertion that "...nothing can be more foreign to the Commune's spirit than the replacement of universal suffrage with hierarchical investiture"⁵ is illustrative.

The representation of the original idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes complete if Engels' well-known preface, from 1895, to "The Class Struggles in France" is also added. If this text, in which there is noted the necessity of using parliamentarism as a means of achieving the revolution, is read in correlation with the one mentioned earlier, according to which the democratic republic is the political framework for achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat, one clearly sees the organic connection between this and the strict respecting of representative democracy in its entirety. Lenin's rejection of parliamentarism and the denial of its historical importance for constructing the socialist society are exaggerations not existing in the original articulation of the thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the expression of a historical situation in which the institutions of bourgeois parliamentary democracy did not operate. Of course, considering the internal and international conditions under which the October Revolution occurred, the tactic adopted by Lenin seems justified and, in fact, the only possible one.

Consequently, it can be asserted that the original idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot inspire in any way despotic, antidemocratic practices--as the common meaning of the word "dictatorship" suggests--arbitrary and abusive, totalitarian actions.

The historical conditions for the occurrence of the October Revolution, for the establishment of a socialist power for the first time, were the background for the interpretation that Lenin gave to the thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the addition of new connotations of it, not existing in its initial form, but which came to be considered obligatory.

A first addition of this kind refers to the establishment of the new state, of necessity, through armed violence, through a revolutionary process founded generically on one form of armed struggle or another. The combining of these elements into a whole expressed the situation in which the imperialist war acted as a catalytic ferment for the outbreak of revolutions in several European countries. Its absolutization passed very easily over Engels' objections regarding the absence of real possibilities of obtaining success in the revolution through insurrection in the developed capitalist societies, just as it did not take into account, either, the remarks concerning the chances offered by bourgeois parliamentarism to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

A second addition asserted that within the dictatorship of the proletariat it does /not share/ state power with any other social group, including the ones that participated actively in the struggle to gain power. The alliance with these groups was conceived as a relationship by means of which they accept the political leadership of the working class. It was undoubtedly a sectarian view of the dictatorship of the proletariat--moreover, one in a profound contradiction with the fact that in any revolution the new state is the power of the classes that fought for its victory. This view led to serious errors with regard to the methods of building the new class relations, the treatment of the interests of the other social groups in the transition to the new society, even to the favoring of un- and antidemocratic practices.

Finally, a third connotation consisted of accepting the restriction of democracy and even its abolition for the bourgeoisie and its political forces. This point caused R. Luxemburg, a prominent figure of the revolutionary movement in the era and an active supporter of the October Revolution, to draw attention to the danger of an evolution toward undemocratic authoritarianism.

Under the conditions of Stalinist dogmatism, the above-mentioned extension of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat led to the overlooking of the necessity of establishing a body of institutions and relations based on the values and norms of representative democracy, of the totality of civil rights and liberties. This way of viewing the dictatorship of the proletariat was imposed as the only alternative of the transition to socialism, without taking into account the many objections regarding the historical, regional and national characteristics of the development of the various societies. The standardization of the political strategy had as an effect the stagnation of the revolutionary process in no few social situations, the commission of errors with irreversible effects. At bottom, dogmatism distorted profoundly the original thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

However, this idea became more and more visibly too narrowminded when two main aspects of the functioning of political relations, insufficiently conscientized until then, were brought out--that the political power of a class is not identical with its state power, and this is not based only on force, on the imposition of will. On this plane there arose the important theoretical contribution of the Italian Marxist, from the interwar period, A. Gramsci.

Indeed, the political power of a class or group of classes has not been based exclusively on force in any order, in other words, on authority, law or domination, but has always involved to one degree or another the action for achieving a /consensus/ (consent) of the subordinate classes on the ground of the ideology of the ruling class and of the social action that it inspires. While authority (domination) is embodied in state power, the social consensus is produced by means of a network of nonstate and state institutions--nonstate ones, in particular--that radiate the ideology of the hegemonic class--but also the political mechanisms for obtaining the adhesion of the will of the other social categories and classes. In the political system's action on society, the achievement of the hegemony of the ruling class and, on this basis, of the social consensus fulfills, most often, the main role, and authority (force) comes to the fore only in the phases of imbalance, of instability. The times in the evolution of an order in which the ruling class exercises its power through predominantly authoritarian and repressive means reveal its hegemonic instability, the erosion of its influence.

In this light, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat seems restrictive and inadequate since it lays stress only on the element of domination, of authority, without emphasizing the necessity and importance of consensus as a basic ground for forging the new society. While the first element is necessary, it is by no means sufficient and its priority utilization runs the risk, in the long run, of causing the accumulation of acute difficulties in the transitional process and even of endangering it. Consequently, the socialist political regime cannot be restricted to state power, and this identified with the domination or dictatorship of a single class, of the proletariat. The socialist political system can achieve its mission insofar as it represents the exercise of state power, on terms of equality, by all the social categories and classes involved in the construction of socialism, which

entails its articulation as a totality of democratic relations and institutions, on the basis of the values and norms of representative democracy, of civil rights and liberties. At the same time, the balanced functioning of the political system depends on the weight and role of the consensus-generating nonstate institutions, on the new relationship that is established between the action of the authoritarian factors and those for forging the hegemony of the working class.

All these things are especially valid because the historical experience of the transition to the socialist society brought out the real danger of authoritarianism, its risks that are not counterbalanced by any advantage.

Under the conditions of the modern era, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat is, on the grounds of all these considerations, obsolete.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Opere" [Works], Vol 7, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1960, p 87.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Opere Alese" [Selected Works], Vol 2, Bucharest, Publishing House of the PMR [Romanian Workers Party], 1952, p 415.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Opere," Vol 22, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1965, p 29.
4. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Opere," Vol 3, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1958, p 212.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Opere," Vol 17, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1963, p 358.

12105

CSO: 2700/183

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

PEOPLE'S COUNCIL APPOINTMENT--On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the people's councils, the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ilie Matei is delegated to fill the position of chairman of the executive committee of the Caras-Severin People's Council. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I, No 28, 20 Apr 83 p 1]

DEFENSE MINISTRY APPOINTMENTS--The president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Lt Gen Gheorghe Gomoiu is relieved of his position as deputy minister of national defense and secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Army and appointed deputy minister of national defense and commander of the Army Services Command. Comrade Lt Gen Ilie Ceausescu is appointed deputy minister of national defense and secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Army. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I, No 28, 20 Apr 83 p 2]

CSO: 2700/201

VOJVODINA SAWP CONFERENCE DISCUSSES EMPLOYMENT, CULTURE

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 83 p 4

[Article by Z. Serences and B. Gulan: "Some Are for Punishments, But Not for Work"]

[Text] Novi Sad, 15 Mar--At today's meeting, the delegates to the Provincial Conference of the Vojvodina SAWP [Socialist Alliance of Working People] discussed current issues in employment and finding work in the province, and established their own tasks in this field. The essence to which the discussion of this subject, which lasted for several hours, could be reduced has to do with the fact that employment has to be an inseparable part of development policy and the implementation of stabilization policy. Significant room for employment should be ensured primarily through greater utilization of capacities, an intensification of agricultural production, a greater orientation toward exports and the development of small business, and finally, these tasks have to be the tasks of everyone in the front of the organized socialist forces and in the delegate system. The involvement of all employee councils and their solidarity are particularly required in resolving the issue of unemployment.

In fact, at the end of last year, there were about 603,000 people employed in Vojvodina, but in spite of the significant results in employment, there are still a considerable number of people seeking work. The number of these has even increased, and now amounts to 90,000, of which two-thirds are young people; the proportion of women in the total number of those seeking work is also two-thirds.

Concreteness and Responsibility

"In our society, the problem of unemployment, especially among young people, has the significance of a basic ideological-political, socioeconomic and moral issue," Jelena Cupurdija stressed in her opening speech, advocating a concrete and responsible struggle to carry out the tasks in the field of employment in all areas. She added, "It will be necessary to conduct a resolute struggle for a change in behavior. We have to surmount the theoretical and general discussions and explanations of the situation, and direct our overall activity toward the delegate system and the development of self-management, calling attention to the tasks and actions that the Vojvodina SAWP organizations undertake. These actions will primarily include ensuring

that in the future, not one collective can adopt a development plan unless it contains these issues, as well as introducing new shifts, examining the possibilities for curtailing the working hours of workers with difficult working conditions, valuing productive and creative work more highly, and providing a concrete stimulus for more food production."

Without a Monopoly by "the Qualified Ones"

Stating that events have justified opening a discussion in Vojvodina on the tasks in the area of culture, Stojan Zamurovic, a member of the Presidency of the [PK] Provincial Committee of the Vojvodina SAWP, made the following comments, among others, on current issues in carrying out the Vojvodina SAWP's tasks in culture:

"Something deserving attention and analysis has come out of the atmosphere created in connection with a theoretical performance and with some other phenomena in cultural life. Cultural-political history has been enriched with several new data, new "cases," as they say, which have now convinced us on the broadest scale of at least one thing: The protagonists of a counterrevolutionary approach--who have chosen the sphere of culture for their nationalistic missionary activities, for demonstrating petty bourgeois liberalism, for disputing the entire historical orientation of our socialist self-managing community and all of its achievements, for raising a false accusation against communism as an alternative for humanity and accusing the LCY of being responsible for the alleged hopelessness of our situation--having thus selected the field of culture, have been able to choose an occasion for their propaganda as well. This is because it is increasingly more obvious that their assessment, to a considerable extent justified, that the time has come for action with the possibility of an outcome favorable to them, is based on the difficulties we are experiencing, the disagreements among us, and the conflicts that frequently hinder united action."

Emphasizing that the main obligation, not only of the forum but of the entire front as well, is to direct the chief part of its attention to two directions--identifying and assessing these different tendencies, and also recognizing and assessing the forces that we have managed to develop in the field of culture in the self-management delegate system, and agreeing on how to overcome many of our weaknesses, Zamurovic finally stated:

"Creativity can and must be discussed in our system as widely as possible; it cannot be the monopoly of the 'qualified ones.' SIZs [self-management interest communities] have to nurture this important function of theirs much more carefully than they are doing now. Naturally, they cannot grow into some sort of self-appointed censorship, but they also cannot be indifferent with respect to creative and action programs and projects. On the contrary, the voice of artists and creative individuals responsible for cultural activities has to play a much greater role in making decisions on exchanging work."

Zamurovic added, "Finally, there will be far more cultural cooperation and self-management integration of cultural activities, with many more initiatives and ideas, if it is carried out on the ground of cultural and artistic

creativity, if it is conducted by those creative people whose works enrich and ennoble our times, and which will bear witness of these times to future generations. The anachronistic consciousness of 'Soldier for the Serbian Cause,' such as manifested in 'Knife,' 'Dovecot,' 'The Real and the Possible,' the serialized 'Migrations of the Serbs' or the absolute falsehood about 'Sorabi,' just like the consciousness of other fighters for any 'nationalistic cause,' is the greatest barrier to such cooperation, since it sows distrust and antagonism and destroys the sensitive fabric of self-management cultural communication."

9909

CSO: 2800/231

SLOVENIAN TRADE UNION GUIDELINES REFLECT GROWING WORKER DISCONTENT

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Apr 83 p 2

[Excerpt] The guidelines on action by the Slovenian trade unions under the sharpened conditions of economic operation, [guidelines] which were recently adopted by the Republic trade union governing council, have found a large response and varying commentary among the Slovenian public.

According to the findings of the Republic [trade union] council, frequently changing conditions in the operation of the economy about which workers are not informed, the restrictive policy regarding personal incomes, wildly fluctuating prices, and the numerous administrative measures which restrict the area of maneuver for self-management action by the workers, stifle their initiative, and continue to shift the burden of the stabilization program onto the workers, i.e., their personal incomes, --[these] are largely to blame for the unfavorable economic trends this year.... All of this is resulting in a reduction in business operation, a worsening of the self-management position of the workers, and an increase in "work stoppages," since there is a growing number of workers who believe that the problems and disputes which have arisen because of state intervention-ism are not possible to resolve through regular self-management methods.

Worth noting also is the statement [in the guidelines] that "concern" is growing on various levels regarding the work and life of workers which make it seem as if they are not the subject of economic operation and decision-making; and [the guidelines] warn that this "concern," the protagonists of which are those who desire to keep power in their own hands, is largely responsible for a situation which is leading workers to seek, justifiably or not, a solution outside...their work milieu.

In addition to intensifying the action of trade union organizations and leaders in overcoming the present "unenviable, uncertain, and electrically-charged situation," the republic [trade union] council has also adopted several "firm" views, i.e., demands which have the tone of an ultimatum. The demand is made to the organs of authority to enact economic measures which will provide more stable and balanced conditions of economic operation, more realistic planning and execution of adopted plans, and the warning is given that the measures of the current economic policy must not make the socio-economic position of workers worse. It is proposed that the

republic assembly immediately begin an analysis of economic trends in the first quarter [of this year], establish the causes for deviation, and propose measures for the consistent fulfillment of the agreed-on policy. If the agreed-on material limits are not realized, the trade unions will initiate changes and additions to the Resolution for this year. The guidelines also contain the request that the workers be given as soon as possible the proposals contained in self-management agreements on the pooling of foreign exchange funds of OURs (organizations of associated labor) which are linked on the basis of income, in accord with the revised law on foreign exchange transactions and credit relations with foreign countries. The guidelines also ask all organs of authority in the republic and federation to prepare as soon as possible the mechanism, i.e., the complete set of measures, for carrying out Article 69 of the Foreign Exchange Law.

The request is made of those who make proposals on socioeconomic policy on all levels that preparations be made immediately on the program for stabilizing prices which must be based on a detailed analysis of the economic position of individual sectors and which must plan the rate of time involved in certain necessary price changes and the criteria for making these changes. Without such an analysis,...the republic trade union council will not give its consent to a single price increase....

The guidelines reactivate also the earlier request that the policy to reduce expenditures on all levels and in all areas be consistently implemented and that a revision of the entire tax policy be proposed as soon as possible in discussion with workers. In this connection the warning was also made that the trade unions reject the taxing of products and services, the goal of which is simply to collect funds to finance the budgets of sociopolitical communities and especially to oppose the unselective introduction of new taxes or a tax increase on basic products....

Since the increase in funds for personal incomes is diverging from the agreed-on ratio and in the first 2 months [of this year] real personal incomes declined 8.6 percent instead of the 7.5 percent planned for the entire year, the trade unions have asked that those who signed the republic social agreement be summoned for an urgent meeting, that the actions arising from the regulations of this agreement be analyzed on the basis of the data for the first quarter, and that necessary changes and additions be proposed. This is based on the assessment that the agreement on...income distribution this year is not stimulating an increase in production, in labor productivity, in economic operation, profitability, and exports.

While the workers offer unreserved support to the proclaimed resoluteness and fighting spirit, they also direct well-intentioned reproaches to the effect that the trade unions, above all the leaderships, from the federal to the opstina level, bear part of the responsibility for the unfavorable trends in associated labor because they have not opposed in a timely, adequate, and decisive way measures which are alien to healthy economic logic and are blocking the independence and self-management of the workers collectives. They [the workers] support the demands which the republic trade union council

directs to the "organs in authority" and at the same time ask from their trade union leaders that they fully free themselves from opportunistic tactics and that, instead of giving belated warnings and criticizing administrative measures and actions after they have been taken, they show more initiative and aggressiveness in making concrete the wide authority and responsibility which the trade unions are given by the Constitution and the Law on Associated Labor.

CSO: 2800/286

ORIGINS OF CHAUVINISM IN YOUNG PEOPLE TRACED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1680, 13 Mar 83
pp 13-15

[Article by Slobodanka Ast: "The Roots of Prejudices"]

[Text] Lascina was a shock. The orgies of nationalism in the university dormitory were unfortunately the dramatic overture, at least in the pages of the press, to a series of nationalistic excesses among young people--chauvinistic graffiti in the center of the large cities, the stoning of the Hajduk soccer team's bus in Belgrade, nationalistic songs at rock concerts, a unique kind of euphoria in celebration of the so-called Serbian New Year's in Belgrade, Sabac, Kraljevo, Leskovac, Smederevo.... Young people, as POLITIKA has written, have aggressively "discovered" their own "new" hits: "The Serbian Trumpet Is Heard From Kosovo," "Whoever Says 'Serbia Is Small' Is a Liar," "Oh, General Sindjelic." And in other parts of the country there have been excesses which give painful warning that the specter of chauvinism has thrown certain young heads into confusion.

In recent days the news has come in of nationalism in the schools. At the "Veljko Vlahovic" Educational Center in Svetozarevo some secondary school students, "above average and above their age group," as a group of teachers have asserted, demonstratively entered the school not long ago wearing fur hats, Serbian-style garrison caps, homespun breeches, and the insignia of the Thessalonika fighters. This small group (excellent students, incidentally) also held the floor at the school Marxist discussion session, where they uncritically debated Fascism and Nazism.

Young People Divided

Radoslav Jovanovic, chairman of the Svetozarevo Opstina LC Committee, has put part of the blame on teachers specializing in particular subjects who "out of a desire for personal convenience and because of their inactivity, as well as because of their lack of political vigilance," created room for these young people to get on the wrong track.

How is one to explain that in a society which has achieved the highest degree of equality nationalism is finding followers even among the young generation--that is the question being put ever more frequently in public.

There is no need to mention in particular that there is a danger of exaggeration. This journalist has heard at least seven or eight "reliable" reports about nationalistic outbursts among young people. They turned out to be nothing more than rumors. Perhaps this phenomenon can be explained both by the halo effect, but also by a particular mental aberration because we have often covered this delicate problem over with a dangerous silence.

Chauvinism among young people has traditionally been attributed mostly to bad upbringing; the family and the school are unanimously accused. It is quite certain that we should not underestimate the influence of the family, nor of the performance of youth and other sociopolitical organizations, largely consisting of paperwork and rhetoric. In a meeting of the school conference of the Socialist Youth League of the "Veljko Vlahovic" School Lidiya Vasiljevic, a high school girl, said that at party meetings there was never anything said about those matters which concern young people, that young people feel isolated and alienated.

Although we are often inclined to view young people as an isolated segment, as a single category, they are a part of society, and the roots of nationalism among them in the eighties should be sought first in a wider field--everywhere around us. Dr Dragomir Pantic, researcher in the Belgrade Social Sciences Institute, says: "Young people are just as stratified as society itself. The same divisions also apply to young people, which accounts for the manifestations of nationalism."

It is almost superfluous to put the question of whether young people could have passed through our divisions and splits unhurt, through the language trials and cultural battles, the falsifications of history, the high-pressure promotion of hoked-up peculiarities, the overheated atmosphere in which statehood and ethnic separateness are above all else.

Recently sociologists have asked young people what is less acceptable to them as an alternative--a change of employment, moving to another city, a change of republic, or emigration? The young people answered that the most difficult thing for them was a change of--republic?! Allegiance to one's own republic or province is certainly not nationalism, but we have to be concerned about the fact that young people would prefer to leave the country than to go to another federal unit. An obvious consequence of the closing of the regional borders, of the exclusive markets, of the exclusive cultural horizons, of the bounded information and educational systems.

The Pale Picture of Community

The atomization of everything that exists in common has had the result that the schoolchildren from different places cannot arrive at an understanding not only with their contemporaries from another republic or province, but in Kosovo not even with their immediate neighbors. Matters related to a change of school or enrollment in a university "in another place" have been taken almost to the point of absurdity, and there is already talk about a kind of official procedure for recognition of credits earned elsewhere.

Recently a survey entitled "The Ethnic and the Yugoslav in Secondary School History Books," an interdepartmental project of Belgrade University and Zagreb University directed by Dr Djordje Stankovic, Drago Roksandic, M.A., and Dr Niksa Stancic, shows that the age groups now in secondary school have only a very pale and general idea of what the Yugoslav community stands for. Today's secondary school students are absorbing historical subject matter at such differing levels and with such a small "core of Yugoslav figures" that in the opinion of Dr Djordje Stankovic this is a "serious social and political danger."

In this unique survey the Belgrade and Zagreb historians have stressed the question of what sort of historical awareness should be developed, how to develop ethnic consciousness, and then Yugoslav consciousness, internationalist consciousness, and humanistic consciousness. It is our desire to cultivate critical spirits, not to reproduce the traditional myths and to create new ones, the researchers have said.

"Our attitude toward our own nationalities and other nationalities, the building of ethnic tolerance or ethnocentrism, a spirit of Yugoslav community or nationalism, will depend in large part on how our historical consciousness is shaped, on our idea of the past," Dr Djordje Stankovic said in an interview with NIN, adding that manifestations of nationalism among young people are by no means accidental. We also wanted to see, he said, to what extent these prejudices are shaped by our uncritical and unscientific attitude, by the errors and imperfectness of our educational policy.

The ranking of individuals who occur in high school history textbooks has already been discussed in the pages of our newspaper. In the meantime the scholars working on this interdepartmental project have shifted from quantitative analyses to qualitative. It is their conclusion that the traditionalistic writing of political history, numerous domestic and foreign figures, as the historians say--"the dynastic and foreign factor"--predominate in the interpretation of historical processes in all the textbooks (19 of them) except to some extent in the Slovene textbooks.

Dr Stankovic does not beat about the bush: "We became disturbed when we saw the ranking of historical figures. The core of Yugoslav figures is extremely small. It is especially disturbing that many significant figures are not mentioned in certain textbooks, while others of far less importance are exaggerated in line with political errors of the shapers of educational policies."

It is quite certain that there are social phenomena and figures in the history of every nationality in Yugoslavia which in their humanistic messages and progressive values deserve a place not only in the textbooks of "their own community," but also in all the others, the scholars conclude.

When Pasic Is Not There....

Dr Djordje Stankovic emphasizes that the omission of certain figures, especially dynasties, is a socially dangerous phenomenon:

"The Karadjordjevic dynasty is not mentioned at all in the textbook for the first year of secondary school in Serbia proper. What does this mean in the process of building up the pupils' ideas of the past? Nothing other than an open door to what we might call a parallel history and all sorts of political manipulations. If in school the student does not get the knowledge necessary about the Karadjordjevic dynasty which has been critically verified by historical science, and that precisely at the time when he himself is building rational ideas about the world, then he will gain that knowledge somewhere else, above all where the commonplace mentality is creating its own nationalistic myths."

In the opinion of NIN's informant, there is a danger not only in the omission of certain figures, but also in the silence maintained about their role in history. That is the case, for example, with Nikola Pasic. Pasic joined two centuries; two histories--the Serbian and the Yugoslav--in his career as a statesman and politician. However, in the history textbooks for the first and second years of secondary targeted education in Serbia proper Pasic is mentioned only once in the phrase: "He was a distinguished Serbian bourgeois politician and leader of the Radical Party." No mention is made of his indisputably large credit for creating the Yugoslav state nor his most significant activity as a statesman (1903-1918), nor even the period of his markedly conservative posture in Yugoslavia in the period 1921-1926.

"The consequences for shaping the student's awareness of history cannot be other than devastating. When Pasic is not there in the textbook, and the science of history is unable to break through the blockade of the dogmatic approach and the errors concerning this figure, the student will suck up that knowledge from the petty bourgeois myth about "the father of the nation who knows what he is about" and historical novels which merely perpetuate that myth.

It is equally dangerous if the most important events in our past are passed over in silence or treated too uncritically. It is still worse if these are dates which have Yugoslav importance and they are given negative value judgments without explanation. That is the case, Dr Djordje Stankovic says, with the creation of the Yugoslav state and with 1 December 1918. "In the history textbook for the second year of secondary school in Serbia proper you will not find a single word about this date, one of the most important events in the history of the Yugoslav peoples. You can well imagine, then, what sort of attitude the student will have toward Yugoslavia today in this horrifying divisiveness and the eruption of Balkan provincialism and nationalism! When we add to this the unscholarly statements about Yugoslavia (the Comintern formulas) as a 'prison of the nationalities,' when 1918 is spoken about as a 'second occupation,' then the doors are opened wide to bourgeois and nationalistic interpretations."

When school textbooks do not offer complete and critical clarifications of these events, then the parallel history gets new young followers. Magic formulas about the "age-old aspiration of our nationalities to live together" nor about "brotherhood and unity" will no longer be of help here.

"If the student does not become aware while still in secondary school that Yugoslavia came into being as a vital necessity for each of its nationalities, that there did exist in the past and that there are developing even today integrationist forces of the Yugoslav community of nationalities, then he looks for his ideas about the past, as an essential element of his personal integrity and his view of the world, within his own nationality, in his own regionalism and localism," Dr Stankovic believes.

It is obvious that our historical consciousness is now being put to the test every day. The student cannot learn from his history book to distinguish between the ethnic and the nationalistic, nor to recognize what is Yugoslav and what is community. The curricula and the textbooks as they now stand are losing the battle with television, journalism, and the revival of the traditional bourgeois consciousness. Dr Mirjana Gros, a well-known historian and Zagreb University professor, notes bitterly that in the extensive experimental exercise ground of the schools the teaching of history has become a caricature. And young people seek above all a critical and consistent Marxist reassessment of our past, especially the most recent past. And only an all-inclusive scholarly evaluation can guide them toward the integrative forces of the Yugoslav community of nationalities, Dr Stankovic says [sic].

Unfortunately, there have been no similar analyses of other secondary school textbooks within Yugoslavia. The long years of discussion about the literature textbook and the "republic sheepfolds" as these divisions of ours were recently termed with Branko Copic's wit, are quite certainly rounding out the disturbing situation to which the historians have called attention.

Some people at one time pinned great hopes on a new subject--Marxism. However, as shown by the survey entitled "Analysis of Achievement of the Goals and Tasks in the Teaching of Marxism in Secondary Targeted Education" (Bureau for Advancement of Upbringing and Education in Belgrade), certain results have been achieved on the educational side, but on the side of upbringing they are minimal. It was expected (let us not repeat all the heavy words uttered at the time) that the teaching of Marxism would among other things contribute considerably to improving the awareness of our social, economic and political development. The research has pointed up that the situation, to put it mildly, is unsatisfactory. The students, it has turned out, are far better informed about events in the world.

Why Should We Be Surprised

How much color will be added to the pale picture of community by the so-called "common cores," which have for years now been aborning with labor (assuming they are ultimately adopted)? In the opinion of Miloljub Peric, counselor for Marxism in the Serbian Republic Committee for Education, common subject matter is actually not a condition for bringing up young people in a spirit of community. The essential thing is the work done in bringing up young people, Peric says. His opinion, that the school's upbringing function is now at a lower point than before the reform, is not an isolated one. There is no longer time in the secondary school for young people's conversation, inquisitiveness and curiosity.

But let us return to those fur caps and ethnic symbols on the chests of elementary schoolchildren and their somewhat older fellows. Here the sphere of the political and ideological passes over even into psychology. The specialists warn that for the age group between 12 and 16, when social identity is being shaped, ethnic symbols may be a marking of the group, external expressions of the search for identity. Sometimes this is extremely superficial external "plumage" to attract attention, and at times it may be an expression of profound deformation of consciousness.

This age group wants to commit itself. If the community does not offer a well-articulated solution to the problem, or if there are several parallel models, some of the young people may even fall under such influences. Dr Nenad Havelka, a professor in the psychology department of Belgrade University, says of this age group that it is not gasoline, but gasoline fumes. Which spark will ignite the fire depends on what is offered.

Young people are victims, and sometimes even unwitting tools, of nationalists. The Irredenta in Kosovo pushed the young people into the front ranks, and they have also been the tools of Serbian nationalists as well as in the assault troops of the mass movement in Croatia. It is thought by some that the crisis we have entered has perhaps hurt young people the worst. The school systems carved out into plots, the increasingly narrow doors of the universities and difficulties in obtaining employment may be a reason for some young people to look for those responsible on the other side, in another nationality.

Although young people are the most researched segment of Yugoslav society, in the opinion of Dr Sulejman Hrnjica, professor of psychology, we actually do not have a clear idea about the developmental dynamics of the ideological consciousness of young people. In his opinion, we do not follow social events in a relevant way "and it is no wonder that we are constantly being surprised."

It is paradoxical, but true--some 10 years ago there were more scientific surveys done even in this delicate sphere, more public opinion surveys, especially the opinion of the young generation.

Professor Nenad Havelka who with Dr Nikola Rot, professor, studied ethnic ties and values among secondary school students 10 years ago, says that the young people have offered the greatest and most enduring resistance to the processes of disintegration. That research in the seventies showed that young people from all social strata also had the greatest and strongest Yugoslav, internationalist and mondial orientation.

Over the last 10 years or so, as we said, there have been no surveys of this kind. The census, however, confirms that the percentage of those declaring themselves to be Yugoslavs is highest among young people. Certainly not because of a negation of their own nationality, but because they are the children of mixed marriages. Probably this was a spontaneous protest against our division tables and exclusiveness.

7045

CSO: 2800/267

LALIC DISCUSSES CHURCH INFLUENCE AMONG YOUTH

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 83 p 2

[Text] Recently, a great deal has been said in Croatia about attempts to politicize the church, growing clericalism, and the increasingly more pronounced clericonationalism which is obtaining a base and spiritual support in certain church circles. Admittedly, these phenomena are nothing new; our society has encountered them to a greater or lesser extent in other circumstances as well. It seems, however, that on this occasion these phenomena are part of a broader offensive by reactionary forces which, making use of our well-known economic and social difficulties, believe that now they would have much greater prospects for success.

Naturally, our attitude toward these phenomena, with which our society dares not and cannot be reconciled, and which it cannot tolerate, is not determining the attitude of our society toward the church, believers, and religious freedoms. After all, regardless of temporary deadlocks, greater or smaller difficulties, and even disagreements, our society's relations with the church have always proceeded along an upward path, and it is certainly in the interest of both society and the church to have them further enhanced. This, of course, does not mean that in the future we should not expect uncertain disagreements, since just as within the church there are forces not favoring an enhancement of our relations, in society, and sometimes even in the LCY, sectarianism with respect to believers and their place in our system has not been eradicated.

Aggressive Hierarchy

This was discussed in the last few days by the Marxist Forum of the Zagreb SAWP [Socialist Alliance of Working People], at which Prof Ivan Lalic spoke about relations with the religious communities. The forum's guest, who is also the chairman of the Croatian Assembly's Commission for Relations with the Religious Communities, had on this occasion a large and curious audience in the full hall of the SAWP Social House; this indicates very clearly that this subject is arousing great interest among the citizens. Naturally, the talk dealt primarily with the situation in the Catholic Church, since it is the largest religious community in Croatia.

It was clear from the start that Lalic did not mean an unambiguous concept by this, and that he distinguished several tendencies within the Catholic Church. Lalic singled out, as the largest tendency within the leadership of the Catholic hierarchy, the so-called integrationist tendency, which, although it formally accepts the position assigned it by the constitution, is actually attempting to impose Catholicism as the only ideology, the only correct outlook on the world, and the only worthwhile system. This tendency, which is after all not unique to Yugoslavia, but is rather a reflection of trends in the Catholic Church worldwide, essentially aspires to a social status in which the church would be the sovereign factor making decisions on secular issues (without being responsible to anyone for this). It is not necessary to emphasize that Marxism and atheism are the main objects for it to attack in its ideological exclusivism. In the extreme case, Lalic said, by rejecting Marxism, it also rejects socialism.

This tendency, however, should be distinguished from another one, which is smaller in numbers, but is taking an aggressive and vocal approach. These are individuals within the church hierarchy who acting directly from hostile positions with respect to our society, and within this wing, Croatian nationalists have always found not only support, but also spiritual inspiration.

Finally, Lalic also mentioned a third tendency, particularly present in the lower clergy, which accepts socialist self-management as a reality in Yugoslavia, and which wants to find a place for itself within our system. It is willing to conduct a conversation and a dialogue, and seek a common language with society.

One of the questions addressed to Lalic was how to conduct ourselves with respect to these different tendencies.

He said that administrative measures are the least acceptable, although in some cases they are necessary, since it happens that individual church figures overstep the bounds permitted by positive legal regulations. As a rule, however, our system and its subjective forces should utilize the means of a political struggle. After all, it is much more productive if petty political activity is exposed and unmasked in an open dialogue, in a public forum, and if the essence of the reactionary theses that are frequently wrapped in the cloak of religious freedoms and humanism, but are actually an attack on humanism, is bared, then if administrative prohibitions or court sentences are imposed.

Sticks and Stones--Against Whom?

How should we resist the indoctrination of youth by a foreign church? What sort of counterargument should we use to oppose a priest who organizes a match or a game for "children off the street," or even a "heretical" priest who finds time to speak openly with young boys and girls about modern music, drinking, drug abuse, sex, and contraception?

"We should by no means do it in such a way as to cast sticks and stones at a priest," Lalic said. "After all, he is only doing what he thinks is necessary to attract young people and to win them over to his ideas. Isn't it more logical for the youth organization in the local community to organize a match or recreation? Can young people really learn more about relations between the sexes from a priest than from our specialized institutions? Is a priest really more qualified to talk about drug abuse, alcoholism, and other damaging effects on young people and society than leading experts, who could certainly attract a large number of boys and girls at public forums? Finally, aren't our teachers of Marxism in the schools also educators at the same time? Isn't it their task to bring the Marxist world view closer to young people, instead of reducing their obligation to 2 hours of dry lecturing that is removed from everything that happens in real life, for which young people, who are naturally curious, are seeking answers?"

In short, the church is often merely filling the vacuum left by organized socialist forces, which are occupied with other issues. This, naturally, does not mean that certain church circles are not trying themselves to create room for their activities. Nevertheless, success depends to a great extent on the involvement of social and political factors, and as a rule their success is greater when this involvement is smaller.

"Young people," Lalic said, "are exposed to indoctrination when they are left to themselves, and disoriented. Although one should not overlook family influence as the primary milieu for the upbringing of a young person and the formation of his personality, the fact is that schools and youth organizations could do a great deal more in this regard. Finally, the LC itself has often treated the problem of young people sporadically as some specific problems of youth organizations. The consequences of the lack of broader social concern for youth, which also implies actively including young people in all spheres of life, have also been felt in the counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo, and in the clericonationalistic attacks that have recently been issued in some student dormitories. Certainly the organized socialist forces are not all-powerful—even in a situation in which we do not repeat the errors that we frequently make with respect to young people, there will be those to whom the Lord will appear and who will even claim to have spoken with him. The problem, however, is not that a few people will believe such supernatural occurrences; the danger is rather that 'divine' occurrences are often cited to justify political activity or at least to express some political message."

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BRIEFS

PROFESSOR IMPRISONED--The high chamber of the Banja Luka district court handed down a 6-year sentence to Prof Ivan Pletikosi (57) from Banja Luka who has been an English instructor at the Zagreb Philosophical Faculty. He was charged with the criminal act of enemy propaganda and for damaging the reputation of the SFRY. Both criminal acts were proved during the trial. [Text] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 83 p 14]

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